

PREFACE

101 This study is based on data collected during the
• 121 period of June of 1964 to May of 1965. The focus of the
research was a permanent Bedouin community, the 'Aishaihat
tribe of al-Qasr near the town of Marsa Matruh in the Western
Desert of Egypt. Al-Qasr was selected for study because of its
sedentary and relatively nucleated settlement pattern which
rendered it accessible and manageable in the time allotted for
research; also, because this community had been designated by
the government as one undergoing rapid social change. The
Marsa Matruh area, as a focus for anthropological research,
was first suggested to me by Professor Ahmad Abou-Zeid, an
Egyptian anthropologist who has written on the problems of
social change in the Western Desert.

My original research plan was designed as an ethno-
graphic survey of Bedouin society in the al-Qasr area, and a
concentration on the specific problems related to the govern-
ment's policy of integrating the Bedouins, socially and
politically, into the national society. I was interested in
the various ways in which the Bedouins of the Marsa Matruh
area conceptualized the aims of the government, and in the
structural reorganization, if any, of Bedouin politics and
political thought under the impetus of social change programs.

121 However, the political climate of Egypt at the time of my research made such a study impracticable. In reorienting my research, I decided to confine my study to al-Qasr and an analysis of "micropolitics" at the local community level.

The aim of the present study is, then, an understanding of the political structure of al-Qasr. Also, since no group exists in isolation and relations with others are mainly a matter of politics, I have tried to present here the structural and ideological bases of politics in al-Qasr. This study is concerned with politics in the traditional sense and in the modern sense. An analysis of the traditional meaning of politics necessitates a discussion and understanding of the structural principles of Bedouin society and the manner in which they function in defining the rights and obligations contained in social relationships. Such an analysis also seeks to establish a base level from which we can perceive and understand the political process in al-Qasr and the modern context of Bedouin politics. The main focus of the political analysis in this study is upon authority and leadership roles, as they were in the past and as they are in the present.

121 I should hasten to make one thing clear at this time,
114 for it directly affected the way I went about my research and
*613 the type of data which I collected. In al-Qasr, there exists communication boundaries, and even barriers, corresponding to the structural and territorial lines of the lineage system.

[178] The 'Aishaibat tribe of al-Qasr, once a nomadic tribe, is now

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[178] sedentary, but the semi-autonomous nature of the lineage segments
[186] is maintained to a large extent. The result of this is a de-
[571] emphasis of the "we-feeling" among the population of al-Qasr
and an absence of "sense of community" (Easton 1965:332). By
"community," I refer to a pattern of relatively intensive,
face-to-face social relationships, and the values of solidarity
and common goals to which these give rise. The relationship
between lineage structure and territoriality was such that
kinship segments within the same lineage unit might go days,
and even weeks, with no inter-communication, and the degree
of communication between separate lineage units of the tribe
was less intensive than this. Such a communication pattern
made observation difficult. The fact that Bedouin tribal
society relatively lacks the group ceremonial aspect compounded
the difficulty of gaining an overall perspective of structural
relations, and of witnessing the bases and nature of social
interaction outside the lineage structure. All of this
emerges from a communication structure and kinship structure
differentiated into corporate groups which "discourage close
participation of members in the social relations of the larger
society" (Wolf 1957:7).

121 The structural arrangement of al-Qasr was such that,
in plain language, not a great deal was happening in the
sociological sense. I say this about al-Qasr in comparison
[123] with, for instance, a full-blown village community. Conse-
quently, I observed from day to day that which I could,

• 121 recorded that which people said in formal and informal inter-
123 views, and hoped that events would materialize to corroborate,
in one way or another, that which I heard or suspected.

123 Since al-Qasr lacked the "space-time component of
communal living together" (Firth 1961:27), I was not able to
select a central vantage point from which I could view the
everyday life of the Bedouins. More importantly, since the
Bedouins interpret social structure in terms of a close
relationship between residence and group membership, by the
very fact that I chose to live in al-Qasr, and so had to live
in the territory of some one lineage, I threatened my own
objectivity and that of the Bedouins toward me.

123 In consideration of the time element, I made the
* 613 decision to live with the most prestigious lineage in al-
Qasr. I felt that this association would give me more free-
dom of movement in the field, and would provide me with access
to more data in a shorter time. What I did not know at the
time of my entry into the field was that the Bedouins prize
neutrality and objectivity just as much as the anthropologist.

[829] As the Bedouins often said: "A man should only speak about
the things he knows."

121 This is a study of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. They are
not nomads nor are they even primarily pastoralists. Various
degrees of nomadism and pastoralism exist in the Western Desert
of Egypt among the different units of the Awsal 'Ali tribe.
Therefore, while the Bedouins of al-Qasr may represent a case

121 for comparative study, they do not represent the ethnological entity known as the Awlad 'Ali. However, one might heuristically think of al-Qasr as a post-tribal or pre-peasant stage of social change, and on this basis generate some hypotheses about the sedentarization process or other specific cultural processes.

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104 The translation of the Arabic documents presented here were made in the field. In most of the cases, translating took place on the spot and this may account for some of the awkward phraseology. Arabic terms and names have been transliterated according to the system used by Cowan in An Introduction to Modern Literary Arabic (1958) with certain exceptions: long vowels are shown by a double vowel; the guttural stop is indicated by an apostrophe; and the glottal stop is indicated by the use of a short "e," such as in 'aiela ("family").

000 I owe a great deal of gratitude to my former teachers who have given freely of their time and knowledge and have shown an interest in my training in anthropology and Middle Eastern studies. I would like to thank in particular Dr.

122 William Sanders, of Pennsylvania State University, who introduced me to anthropology; Dr. David Bidney, of Indiana University, and Dr. P. J. Vatikiotis, now of the London School of Oriental and African Studies, who were my advisers in anthropology and Middle Eastern studies during my graduate training; Dr. Irfan Shahid, now of Georgetown University, who instructed me in the Arabic language; Dr. Vincent Cantarino, of Indiana University, who instructed me in Arabic literature

CHAPTER I

THE BEDOUINS OF AL-QASR: PAST AND PRESENT

General Historical Background

• 121 No full historical account of events leading up to the present study is intended here. Only a fragment of history, a backdrop to the discussion of al-Qasr Bedouin society is offered. The account is an effort to trace, historically, the arrival of the Bedouin into the Egyptian Western Desert.

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167 During the Arab conquest of Egypt in 639 A.D., tribesmen made only a few forays into Upper Egypt. But these sojourns represent the first intrusion of the Bedouin strain into this part of the world and were the vanguard of a force which would conquer all of North Africa. The Bedouin tribesmen of the Arab army found the pastures of Upper Egypt similar to their traditional habitat in Arabia, and certain tribe segments settled in the area.

175 In 647 A.D., Muslim troops under the command of Ibn abu-Sarh pushed across the Western Desert as far as Tripoli in present-day Libya. This was an expeditionary force, and not until about 670 did permanent Arab occupation come to Libya. Historical sources are vague about the nature of the relationship between the Arabs and the Berbers of the newly

131 view it, the Western Desert is the watan 28
619 ("homeland") of the A'wad 'Ali tribe, and is subdivided into
631 tribal zones each referred to as a mintaga. Mintagit al-Qasr
is part of mintagit qabilit 'Aishaibat (i.e. "the area of
al-Qasr" is part of "the territory of the 'Aishaibat tribe").

131 Each tribal mintaga is further broken down into contiguous
619 parcels of land belonging to lineages, and these are also
* 613 referred to as mintaga; for instance, there is mintaga
631 'allit Ma'fas, i.e. "the territory of the Ma'fas family."
[423]

In the al-Qasr segmentary lineage society, genealogical
ties and local ties are coincidental. The boundaries of
al-Qasr are defined by the agnatic lines of the 'Aishaibat
tribe and include the sahil and sha'ir wi mar'a zones.

361 To the Egyptians, a garya ("village") is a nucleated
631 cluster of permanent dwellings with some degree of social
integration: al-Qasr is a garya for administrative matters.
The Bedouins, who think in terms of kin-based residence groups,
tribal boundaries, and political and economic symbiotic rela-
tions, see the Egyptian garya as only a sector of al-Qasr.
They refer to this sector as the 'izba, i.e., "farm" or "rural
settlement." The 'izba is land fertile enough to support a
secure and sedentary life. "The 'izba," the Bedouins say,
"is the seed of the madiina" (city).

● [21] For my own purposes, the Bedouin sense of al-Qasr is
the more useful concept. Al-Qasr is all of the territory of
[31] the 'Aishaibat tribe. Situated at 31°N and 27°E, al-Qasr is

*613 the result of the patrilineal principle even though it is
591 by far the most ideologically significant. Other principles
lend structure to associative relationships which may or may
not complement those established by the unilinear rule. It
is the operation of these other principles which give com-
plexity to the social and political organization of al-Qasr.
They may be identified in terms of residence, cognation and
social compacts, or the establishment of contractual relations
above and beyond those defined by patrilineality. The force
of these four structural principles constitute the range or
the structural constraints within which individuals and groups
in al-Qasr conduct their social relations. Specifically, we
*613 are not interested in all social relations. The main interest
591 here is in those relationships in which individuals or groups
• 121 struggle for control, or attempt to exercise power. Our
interest is, then, the political aspect of social relations
or, what Max Weber discussed in terms of, power and established
authority (Bendix 1962:290-297).

*613 It is necessary to discuss the lineage system in al-
[121] Qasr because in a segmentary society, kinship and politics
are analytical aspects of the same process. In the political
structure of al-Qasr, we note first of all that the tertiary
and secondary segments (see Figure 7 below) are the function-
ally significant units. Bait 'Umar, the tertiary segment
diagramed in Figure 8 below, is typical: it is an autonomous
political unit with a discernible authority structure and

*613 formal leadership. Ideologically, group solidarity at this level is explained solely in terms of patrilineality; in fact, local contiguity and explicit contractual ties are just as important. When we add to this the principle of
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582 cognation in the form of the Bedouin preferred form of marriage, parallel-cousin marriage, the resulting structure is what Emrys Peters (1965) has called "the corporate group
[183] par excellence." But, as we shall see later, father's brother's daughter-marriage is more of a cultural ideal than it is a social reality in al-'sr.

*613 The interplay of kinship, residence and contract ties
554 defines a corporate structure of authority and also informs
571 an external system of authority relations including all who claim descent from 'Ali 'Aqar, son of the mythological Sa'ada. The feeling of "corporateness," and the concomitant structural demands upon the individual changes as the scope of political action widens. This degree of corporate feeling is related to the structural differentiation between what has been interpreted as "domestic relations based on kinship and descent" and "the field of political relations" (Fortes 1953:26). In
•121 this study, I maintain that both the internal and the external
*613 systems of relations are political" since power and legitimate
554 authority are exercised in both. Therefore, rather than use
571 the terms "domestic" and "political," I shall refer to the internal system of political relations and the external system

• 121 of political relations. The structural differentiation be-
* 613 tween them relates to certain specifics of role differentia-
554 tion and articulation, and corporate goals. Different roles
571 function differently in different spheres of politics. This
is clear when we consider that the two structural aspects of
corporate group politics serve the double purpose of insuring
local autonomy while promoting integration into the larger
lineage segments. This I will cover more thoroughly in the
next chapter. Most of the discussion here deals with social
structure and, in particular, the internal elements of the
corporate group.

* 613 In the total societal context, the tertiary segment
619 is pivotal for the conceptualization of two models: the
Bedouin's model of his tribal system, and the observer's
model of a segmentary lineage system. Both of these constructs
are shown in Figure 7.¹ Both genealogical models can be
completed by the addition of Figures 2, 3, and 8, extending
the systems both horizontally and vertically.

Theoretically, all of the levels of the Awlad 'Ali
tribal system constitute a political community, i.e., the
various segments shown in Figure 3 regulate and maintain
relations with each other through complementary opposition
(Fallers 1963). But in fact, political action of any functional
significance rarely occurs beyond the secondary lineage level.
In terms of the structural principles, agnation, real or
¹, [See p. 77--Analyst]

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fictive, has practical political consequences only at the tertiary and secondary levels of segmentation. Most political activity in al-Qasr is the result of either cooperation or conflict between corporate groups the size of Bait 'Umar or 'Ailit Ma'fas. 'Ailit Ma'fas is made up of five structurally replicated political groups such as Bait 'Umar. Toward out-

[609] siders, these five groups act as one; they represent a corporate entity before the rest of the tribe. As a member of 'Ailit Ma'fas, an individual has jural status in the whole tribe.

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He also has the means and the moral obligation to articulate his interests and to settle his arguments with other members of the tribe. When an individual is involved in an activity which relates to matters of power and authority, he is playing a political role in the political process. The units which make up the internal and external political systems of the 'Aishaibat tribe of al-Qasr are roles. Roles then are the

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analytical focus of this study. Of course, I realize that the concrete entities present in al-Qasr are human beings.

I only use roles as methodological constructs in order to abstract from, and to understand, Bedouin behavior. By conceptualizing sets of roles as structures, we will be able to understand the internal and external political structures as well as the traditional and modern political structures of Bedouin society. In al-Qasr, these political roles and structures emerge from the more generalized kinship structure

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554 and are related to the organizational principles mentioned above.

619 The Awlad 'Ali represent a cultural entity whose membership is defined in patrilineal terms. Culturally, and genealogically, they are related to the Cyrenaican Bedouin but distinct from the Egyptians of the Nile Valley. The political system of the Awlad 'Ali can be extended to include 619
177 Cyrenaicans "as Bedouins" but it can only interact with the Egyptians "as foreigners." This means that the Awlad 'Ali possess common roles, structures, and cultural institutions which can articulate with those of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. In the case of the Egyptians, however, social interaction calls forth new cultural categories and new structural elements in Bedouin society. This is the basis of political change in al-Qasr. Role differentiation and ideological replacement are taking place vis a vis the nation-state: the traditional political structure of the Bedouins is adapting to the Egyptian political environment. In the language of the "politics of modernization," this process is referred to as "politicization" or "political socialization." We shall deal with this process in later chapters.

The principles which relate the Bedouins of al-Qasr to other Bedouins of the Western Desert and Libya are the organizational principles of kinship, residence, and contract; but the principle which relates them to the Egyptian state is

619 the bureaucratic principle. Here we are concerned with the
177 traditional situation.
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619 The 'Aishaibi Bedouins of al-Qasr are a residence
* 613 group. Each sub-group of the tribe, i.e., the secondary and
571 tertiary units, is assigned their own territory (mintaga).
Kinship and residence are the primary determinants of group
differentiation; agnates who dwell together represent
concrete authority structures, or political groups. This
follows from the fact that patterns of political action, or
what we call political structures, most often deal with the
exercise of legitimate authority--as opposed to power. Power
relations do occur and when present complicate the situation.
In al-Qasr, power relations and structures emerge when the
principle of cognation or contracted alliance form groups
which crosscut the effectiveness of local, agnatic political
structures. But, in al-Qasr, as in most societies, political
action usually takes the form of the exercise of authority
(Southall 1965:120).

173 The genealogical map as an ideological charter argues
114 against the formation of power relations. Genealogical re-
* 613 lations represent a set of social relations each replete with
571 definite rights and obligations. Fallers (1956) has noted
the tendency in segmentary lineage societies to cast all
authority relations in a unilinear genealogical mould. The
* 613 Bedouin visualize their world, extending from Alexandria to
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*613 Libya, as a territorially segmented one corresponding to the
829 lineage divisions of the tribe. They say that every Bedouin
173 knows the owner of each centimeter of this world. Not only
571 does the genealogy represent a set of property relations, it
also represents and upholds a set of authority relations. In

*613 Cyrenaica also (Peters 1960), the Bedouin genealogical map
173 corresponds to the distribution of groups on the ground.
571 Kinship relations as social relations in Bedouin society may
be properly interpreted as property relations between groups.
Property relations as part of the Bedouin world view are an
essential premise upon which the social and political order
rests, although it is not the only premise.

619 The 'Aishaibat are identified with the al-Qasr portion
*613 of the Awlad 'Ali homeland. The 'Aishaibi segments are
separate and contiguous on the ground. Figure 3a¹_A shows the
correspondence between the 'Aishaibi genealogical and ter-
ritorial divisions at the secondary lineage level of segmenta-
tion.

121 That kinship as an organizing principle in segmentary
*613 societies cannot be considered apart from local contiguity
is an old and well-known fact. Sir Henry Maine (1917:76-79)
in analyzing the evolution of "political ideas" noted the
interrelationship between "the principle of local contiguity"
and the central principle of the "connection in blood," how
they combine to become "the condition of community in political
1, [See p. 66--Analyst]
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● 121 functions." The political system as a structure with reference
* 613 to the territorial principle and descent system is the unit
which the political analyst seeks to understand. To do so,
he must concentrate his attention upon the local descent group,
the corporate group (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940:11;
Leach 1954:128). Structural analysis in terms of functional
group differentiation is preliminary to political content and
political role analysis (Smith 1966:113-129). The objective
121 of this chapter is to define the basic political unit in
Bedouin society and the set of authority relations which
characterize it. We are looking for, what Maine referred to
as, the "Corporation" and its "Public Officer" or "Corporation
sole."

[28] The rest of this chapter is a discussion of the
internal domestic structure of authority and the complex of
values and beliefs which the Bedouins of al-Qasr express about
a desired social order in terms of their principles of organi-
zation. Associative relationships based on kinship, residence
and contract are morally supportive and hence authoritative;
they structure as well as reflect a world order. Such re-
lationships validate traditional authority and contribute
to a system of social control.

619 Lineage Structure and Formal Categories

Not all residents of al-Qasr are members of the Awlad

*613 situation or another (Middleton and Tait 1958:11). The most
571 effective approach to understanding the segmentary society,
•121 in view of this dynamic situation, is to isolate the function-
*613 ally significant unit and to analyze its social and political
571 relations (Fortes 1945). This is what I attempted to do in
my study of the 'Aishaibat of al-Qasr.

*613 In al-Qasr, the secondary segment, i.e., 'Ailit
Ma'fas, is the basic unit of the social structure. This
statement must be qualified seeing that this unit consists
of a balanced opposition of smaller tertiary segments, and
action at the secondary level is a resultant of political con-
sensus at the tertiary level. However, the ties which emerge
from descent, residence, marriage, and contract are highly
moral and utilitarian ones; with reference to tribal politics,
we can state that corporate action is consensual and most
functional at the secondary segment level. We may consider
this group, in terms of two levels of corporateness, the
basic unit of 'Aishaibat political structure.

*613 All of the segmentary groups of the 'Aishaibat are
619 bound together by the same patrilineal principle; they all
trace descent to 'Ali the son of Sa'ada. This principle also
links them to the "noble tribes" of Cyrenaica who claim
descent from this same ancestress. This principle is the
genealogical and ideological basis of a man's claiming to be
'Sa'adi," or "Awlad 'Ali," or "Aishaibi," etc. In theory,

196 only from area to area but also from person to person.

• 121 In terms of the Bedouin social structure, it is useful
* 613 to discuss politics as a set of authority relations operating
571 in a problem-solving situation. This operation takes place
at all levels of the lineage system with the exception of the
sub-tertiary group; below the tertiary group level authority is
purely a function of certain kinship roles. Since we cannot
analytically separate the political aspect of the role "family
head" from the moral aspect of the role "father," it seems
best to designate this type of authority as being something
distinct from political authority. We will call this type
of authority either "familial" or "domestic," and "political
authority" will be considered to exist in cases where there
is some degree of role specialization and role differentiation
with respect to decision-making and problem-solving. As I
conceptualize it, then, the tertiary group is a political
group because it is structurally identified with a corporate
office, or institutionalized role of leadership. At the end
[128] of this chapter, and in the next chapter, I will elaborate
on this because it is a focal point of the study.

121 Structural principles designed to promote integration
571 in a society also shed light on the degree of coercion and
181 conflict in social "organization." Individuals and groups in
society have interests and values which they seek to maximize
in the face of competition and opposition from other individ-

121 uals and groups. Radcliffe-Brown (1952:199) spoke of social
571 relations existing where there was "some adjustment of
181 respective interests, by convergence of interest, or by limita-
tion of conflicts that might arise from divergence of interests."
When a person or group has an interest in an object, material
or immaterial, that object has a certain value for the person
or group. Thus does the study of social structure become,
for Radcliffe-Brown, "the study of interests and values as
the determinants of social relations." Convergence of inter-
ests side by side with a divergence of interests characterizes
any society, and all societies are segmented on one basis or
121 another. I have found it enlightening to consider the seg-
571 ments of al-Qasr Bedouin society as "interest groups." In-
terest groups are the real groups which one can observe in
either integration or conflict. They are real in the sense
that their behavior can be observed. They are real in that
they can be defined by a stable pattern of authority relations
whereas other groups are non-existent in this sense. The
tertiary group and the secondary group, in so far as it is a
coordination of replicate corporate groups, are real groups
in al-Qasr whereas the primary and tribal levels are theoret-
ical or quasi-groups. That is, they are only potentially
interest groups, seeing that, for the time being, they lack
the common interests and coordinated activity to be classi-
fied as an authority, or political, or interest group.

Familial Authority and Rights and Duties in Kin Relations

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The analysis of authority structure, whether it has reference to a group as small as the family or as large as the nation, assumes as its unit of study the social position or the role. The role is the organized complex of rights and duties by which individuals, or categories of individuals, participate in an interactive process. Roles are linked together into a set, or a structure, by the rights which incumbents claim and the duties they fulfill (Linton 1936:113; Parsons and Shils 1951:23; Gluckman 1963:185). The heuristic value of role analysis is well established. Role theory has been referred to as "the highest level of generalization about social phenomena that has yet become in any sense operational (Southall 1959:17).

Since all social roles possess rights and duties just because they are defined with respect to other roles, we may assume that each and every social role has an authoritative aspect to it. The authoritative aspect of roles refers to the way in which authority positions relate in order to give form to an authority structure. We want to know how the authority positions at all levels of the authority structure function, but for the time being we are concerned with familial authority relations. Until we understand the operation of authority at the familial level, which is the source of legitimate political authority in a kin-based

12 | moral community, we cannot proceed to a discussion of the
57 | internal and external systems of political relations.
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57 | As a result of the socialization process, and through
18 | relations with other members of the family, an individual
[867] comes to recognize that his conduct is measurable by certain
standards of, what is considered by the group to be, good and
bad, right and wrong. In al-Qasr, such standards are in-
trinsically correct, or "decent" as the Bedouins say; obedience
to the authority representing these standards is interpreted
[596] as a "duty." The authoritative aspect of the role of household
head (shaib al-bait), and the moral obligations which it repre-
sents, emerge from and reinforce values and structural arrange-
ments central to Bedouin social order, namely, respect for
authority and devotion to social groups, the two basic elements
of morality defined by Durkheim (Parsons 1937:382-385).

57 | The value placed upon social order, and the structural
57 | mechanisms for insuring its realization and extension--kinship,
18 | residence and contract--inform an authority structure which
182 | ranges between filial piety at the family level and a set of
legal norms at the level of the external political system.
The fact that the Bedouins of al-Qasr are interested in
integrating a larger population into their authority structure
means that a common value is operative in the range of it;
also that one sphere of authority will tend to merge into another.

[593] Hence the father-son authority relation has importance for
[691] the strength of Bedouin customary law in the desert. The

The Corporate Group

• 121 Two key concepts have derived from Radcliffe-Brown's
602 (1952:32-49) notion of kinship as a reflection of juridical
* 613 relations. Fallers (1956:14), discussing the expression of
these concepts in segmentary societies, refers to them as
"the lineage principle and its corollary, the corporate
lineage group." For Radcliffe-Brown, kinship organization
represented social order and this was the basis of societal
survival: a social system in order to survive must conform
to certain conditions. Adaptive mechanisms, expressed through
the institutions of a society, consist of a "network of re-
lations between individuals and groups" (1952:43). These
social relations represent a collection of rights and implied
duties which reside either with an individual or a group.
Though reference is made to the place of the individual in
society, the idea of the group is central in the theory of
Radcliffe-Brown.

121 Most important is the group referred to as "corporation:"
602 a collectivity of individuals "who jointly exercise some right
571 or rights," and who share common interests deriving from resi-
621 dence and kinship (1952:45). The corporation has rights
in rem over its members; thus, the group imposes certain duties
and obligations on other persons with respect to the rights of
a particular person who is a member of the corporation. The
law of blood-revenge is seen by Radcliffe-Brown to bring out

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this aspect of the corporation clearly.

The concept of the corporation as a sociological construct was first used by Maine (1904). The concept was a central one in the work of Max Weber (1947; 1954). As it was used by Maine, and later by Radcliffe-Brown, the corporation as a collection of rights and duties functioned primarily to maintain structural continuity in society. Weber was concerned mainly with the political aspects of the corporation; this follows from his theoretical and empirical focus on political action and the exercise of authority. The two main elements of the corporate group as a social relationship according to Weber are that it is limited and defined by rules of admission, and that the administration of the group is carried out by functionaries, incumbents of political roles. An explicit structure of authority is the key to Weber's concept of corporate group: "Whether or not a corporate group exists is entirely a matter of the presence of a person in authority, with or without an administration staff" (1947: 145-146). Weber did differentiate analytically the corporate group from the other concept, first defined by Maine (1907: 108-110), the "Corporation sole" or "Public officer." However, he insisted that one could not exist without the other. Any analysis of the structure of authority in society must focus on both of these concepts.

The conditions for the formation of a corporate group

121 are, as Radcliffe-Brown correctly stated, the existence of
602 kinship ties and common residence. But, as Weber noted, the
571 expression of corporation is absent without a structure of
621 authority. The corporate authority structure functions to
allot group membership and political status; to formulate and
enforce a rule of succession governing the transmission of
property and roles; and to define and assign rights and duties
of group members toward others. Group rights over members,
as rights in rem, produce mutual rights for members which
entitle them to protection against external enemies. Hence
the corporate group is characterized by internal functions
which define and control relationships between members, and
external functions which identify the group within a given
structural context where it has jurisdiction and governs its
relations with other elements in this environment. Within
this context, the corporate group is representative of any
individual member. Both the internal and external functional
aspects of the corporate group operate through the office of
a specialized role whose incumbent has authoritative and
representative powers. This is the role, or office, which
Maine referred to as the "Corporation sole," and which Weber
later called the Leiter ("chief").

*613 In al-Qasr, the corporate lineage group is composed
621 of agnates who reside together in a mintaga, and who accept
571 as legitimate and morally binding an explicit process of

613 decision-making which allocates values in society. This
621 process orders the internal and external political relations
571 of corporation members. The corporate office which acts to
regulate internal affairs, and to represent the group in
external affairs is a unique status in al-Qasr having only
one incumbent at a time. In Bedouin society, then, the
corporation is to be considered distinct from the corporate
sole (Smith 1966).

621 The corporate group, although based on common interests
626 and values, is not an integrated body simply in terms of
571 consensus. Coercion also maintains corporate relationships.

[183] Consensus derives from the code of the group (Nadel 1951:
161), a set of common ideals. But in practice, the group
must exert coercive pressures, sanctions, against individual
behavior which threatens the welfare of the collectivity.
Coercion may be seen as a necessary condition for what Durk-
heim called "mechanical solidarity." In al-Qasr, as in most
societies, the desire for conformity to norms predicates
coercive measures; coercion and consensus derive from the
same cause, i.e., the requirement of some degree of integra-
tion. The corporate group and its authority structure is the
621 mechanism which insures, through political means, the neces-
571 sary degree of integration for the survival of al-Qasr
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• (21) society. In order to understand the phenomenon of social
change occurring in al-Qasr, politics as an aspect of culture

621 should be thought of as an adaptive mechanism. This will help
571 us to understand two structural features of the Bedouin politi-
182 cal system: the establishment of cognatic alliances and the
•121 differentiation of political roles. In tradition and modernity,
the integration and the survival of the Bedouin social system
have depended upon the proliferation of these features.

121 It is quite obvious that "a corporation can only form
621 itself on the basis of a common interest" (Radcliffe-Brown
571 1952:45); that any social relationship, or political group
[626] is characterized by both "pragmatic contents" and "moral
aspects;" and that "political sentiments" as part of the
group's moral and legal norms are enforceable by secular
sanctions brought to bear on individuals or groups (Fortes
121 and Evans-Pritchard 1940:20). But the discovery of what
underlies a "common interest," "moral aspect," and "political
sentiment" is a subtle problem which varies from culture to
culture. It deals with what Weber referred to as "problems
of meaning," and ultimately, the legitimation of the normative
system. What makes morality and sentiments meaningful and
sanctions legitimate is a value, a connecting element between
the social and cultural systems, "the constitutive symbolism
which grounds the identity and solidarity of the community"
(Parsons 1956:17). It is unlikely that such a value will
ever be obvious, no matter how essential it is, because

•121 a tradition is not a mere observed fact like an existing custom . . . ; it is an idea which expresses a value judgment. A certain way of acting is regarded as right; a certain order or arrangement is held desirable. The maintenance of the tradition is the assertion of this judgment (Radin 1935:63).

121 For al-Qasr, I have traced social ideas, social action,
181 and social order to a central traditional value which promotes
621 group consciousness, solidarity, and corporateness. Such a
571 value does not derive from Islam, for Bedouin tradition
171 preceded Islamic tradition, and much of the latter derives from the former. According to Robertson Smith (1903:26-62), the structurally significant unit in pre-Islamic Arabia was the havy: "a collection of people of the same blood" who lived together and fought together. But, that which actually bound the members with a sense of corporateness to the havy was the law of blood-revenge. For Smith, the key element in the Bedouin corporate group was the existence of a covenant of blood responsibility. The group was bound by a compact of mutual responsibility, the group had rights in rem over its members, and within the group there could be no blood-feud. Around this idea of mutual responsibility revolve the traditional values which are the basis of corporate grouping in Bedouin society: "The greater part of the traditions of the Arabs turns on blood-revenge and war . . . " (Smith 1903:26).

Smith developed his analysis of Arabian society in terms of certain structural principles: patrilineal ideology,

121 residence, cognatic ties, and contractual relations are all
181 seem to be structurally important in early Arabian society.
621 Structural differentiation into groups is based on the
571 lineage principle and sustained through "the law of blood-
171 revenge." And it is important to note that the havy was
characterized by a structure of authority, it was "guided
in war and on the march by one chief" (Smith 1903:44). The
121 law of blood-revenge as an expression of group rights in rem
621 and a system of mutual protection point up the importance of
571 contractual relations in Bedouin society. Whether or not
675 real blood ties are involved, a contract must be present or
there can be no corporate group. Contract legitimizes authority
and provides the basis for the lateral extension of the group;
it is primary though it functions coordinately with a principle
of cognation, residence, adoption, etc. Contractual ties
121 operate outside of kinship at times but will always be validated
621 by it eventually, "for a legal fiction is always adopted to
571 reconcile an act with a principle too firmly established to
675 be simply ignored" (Smith 1903:62). "Blood brothers," in
608 al-Qasr, are defined both biologically and ideologically. As
571 noted in the case of al-Qasr, there were at least three cases
1602 of contractual adoption in which one individual and two whole
corporate groups "wrote their names into the books of the
'Aishaibat tribe" (Katab innasiyya 'Aishaibiyya). The integra-
tion or adoption of elements in al-Qasr takes place on the

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621 basis of an agreement "to share the good and the bad" by
591 all parties concerned. Once the integration is effected,
615 patrilineal ideology and legal fiction succeed in concealing
608 the jointure.
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621 The concept which derives from ancient Arabia, and
591 which expresses fully the structural principles of Bedouin
* 613 society is that of 'aqila. The 'aqila, in al-Qasr, is the
head of the corporate group, the tertiary unit or bait. A

[884] person becomes part of the Bedouin jural body when he reaches
the age of 15, begins to keep the Ramadan fast, and is expected
to pay his share of the blood-money. At this time, a man

621 acquires rights over his corporate lineage-mates and they
591 over him: they claim a share in the indemnity ("blood-
* 613 money" - diyya) of each other, and are under obligation to
672 contribute equal shares to any diyya which becomes due from
[882]

the group as a whole. Further, each corporate member is
morally bound to support his lineage-mates by swearing the
oath (yamin) on the behalf of any who are accused of false-
hoods in the course of litigation. All of these rights and
obligations are guaranteed by the presence of an 'aqila.

* 613 The tertiary bait is the minimal corporate group.
It usually includes three to five generations of members.
Tertiary units which are descended from a common ancestor
combine through contractual relations into the maximal corporate
group, the secondary unit or 'aiala. Beyond the secondary level

* 613 or whole tertiary group may be expelled from the lineage
554 group, or if they so desire, they may resign their status in
571 the group. In either case, and both cases rarely occur, the
permission and approval of the 'aqila are required. Or, I
should say, the approval of the 'awaagil is required, for
both cases represent structural changes which affect the
juristic personality and constitution of the maximal corpor-
ation. The legitimacy of the 'aqila and the whole political
structure are tied up together. Social structure and authority
roles are both objects of legitimacy, as Easton (1965:278-301)
says, and hence the legitimacy of the 'aqila in al-Qasr flows
from the structural legitimacy of a segmentary political
system. Thus in al-Qasr, politics operates through authority
groups in opposition to one another, each represented by an
authority role. An 'aqila once told me that "the tribe of
the 'aqila gives him the authority to judge between its
members." Another 'aqila said that "the 'awaagil are bound
(675) by a contract (rawaabit) to perform their duty on behalf of
their bait." The rawaabit ("bonds") we will discuss in the
next section.

Spheres and Focus of Authority

• 121 Authority, as it is used in this study, refers to
the Weberian notion of "imperative control" (Herrschaft);
that is, "the probability that a command with a given specific

•121 content will be obeyed by a given group of persons" (Weber 1947:152). In the next chapter, it will be useful to distinguish between the concept of authority and that of "power." Mainly, we are concerned here with the legitimate exercise of authority in the regulation of conflict involving members of an "imperatively coordinated group" (1947:153), or corporation, at both the internal and external levels of the Bedouin political system.

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114 It has already been stated in the last chapter that
*613 political action occurs at all levels of the social structure;
591 it is not peculiar to the external relational system. The
tendency to differentiate structurally between "domestic relations" and "political relations" began with Evans-Pritchard (1940:148) who analyzed the Nuer political system as "an expanding series of opposed segments from the relations within the smallest tribal section to intertribal and foreign relations." This definition could serve as a description of the political system of the Bedouins of al-Qasr, or of any other segmentary society. Fortes (1949; 1953:26) first used the terms "domestic relations" and "political relations." He arbitrarily limited political action to the lineage structure, and assigned "person-to-person relations" to the sphere of kinship or domestic organization. Southall (1953), who applied the ideas of Max Weber, isolated what he referred to as two different types of authority: the "familial" and

121 the "political." Previous studies, then, indicate that a
114 conceptualization of a division between spheres or foci of
*613 authority relations is fundamental to an understanding of the
571 political aspect of segmentary societies. There is no need,
however, to relegate the political to any particular social
area if "we generally mean by 'political,' things that have
to do with relations of authority . . ." (Weber 1947:155).
Conflict, and the need for it to be regulated, occur at all
levels of the lineage system, from the family to the tribal
level. Authority must be exercised if the system is to
persist. The legitimate exercise of authority in al-Qasr is
[554] expressed through two structures: an authority role and
authority groups, the 'agila' and the tertiary segments, the
corporate sole and corporate groups.

121 The analysis which follows considers society as a
554 composite of authority groups and authority roles. Roles
are the basic elements of social structures which "order the
human beings who make up the society" (Nadel 1957:11). The
authority role is a focus for the study of politics at all
levels of the social structure, and, also, the basis for
extending role analysis. For the most part, political action
in al-Qasr, from the family to the tribal levels, takes the
form of the exercise of legitimate authority. Power, as
illegitimate control, exists in the form of extra-processual
authority roles which we will discuss in the next chapter.

121 Here we are interested in the way in which roles and groups,
554 and a whole structure of authority, operate over a wide area.

In the previous section, I presented the 'aqila' as a specialized political role in Bedouin political organization. As Radcliffe-Brown (1940:xviii-xxi) has pointed out, in the political analysis of segmentary societies it is necessary to isolate incipient authority roles which function to make decisions concerning rightness and wrongness in disputes and which represent the community, giving voice to public sentiment. The notion of society as a functional system of authority roles and authority groups is clear in Radcliffe-Brown's treatment of politics.

121 Local groups of political significance, i.e., authority
554 groups, are identified by the status position, or office, re-
591 ferred to as 'aqila'. The political relations within a local
*[613] tertiary group, and between it and similar groups of a lineage and tribe, must be seen as relationships between authority roles.

554 In the domestic field of political relations, the
596 authority of the Bedouin 'aqila' shades into the familial
*[613] authority sphere of the household head (shaib). The shaib, as senior agnate of his 'naja', is dominant over the other males of his tertiary sub-unit, but not to the extent that he can pre-empt any of their rights as members of the tertiary corporate group. A shaib, by virtue of his age, is supposed
[888] to possess the wisdom which it takes to regulate
[598] conflict.

685 I was in al-Qasr, and each party to the conflict hired
598 Egyptian lawyers in Marsa Matruh to represent them. As one
648 litigant in this case told me: "The Bedouins prefer to settle
their own land disputes because the government's way of
handling these things costs money and long periods of waiting."

69 The notion of jurisprudence in tribal cultures, in
• 121 general, seems to be one which concentrates on the restoration
578 of a disturbed balance rather than one concerned with formality
and procedure. To a great extent, this is true in the Bedouin
case also. However, the absence of institutionalized ways of
dealing with conflict is more characteristic of the internal
* 613 system of political relations. Conflict within the secondary
578 segment, we have noticed, may be regulated at the familial
[593] level of authority by the shaib, or one acting in his place:
[594] it is hoped by the Bedouins that quarrels never become serious
enough to prompt intervention by the 'aqila'. On the other
hand, the 'aqila', as a legitimate representative of his
authority group, will almost always become involved in conflict
regulation falling within the sphere of external political
relations, i.e., conflict between secondary, primary, or tribal
segments.

* 613 The 'aqila' as the most effective mechanism of social
578 control has become institutionalized through time in Bedouin
182 society. At the interactional level of secondary lineage
group relations, conflict may easily expand into feuding or,

577 According to this 'agila, the "good man" is the "good Muslim"
771 who observes the pillars of Islam (fasting, praying, making
183 the pilgrimage, and alms-giving). Also, the "good man" does
not steal or lie, and this leads, importantly enough, to social
accord.

121 In light of the preceding discussion of authority and
681 law, we can now offer a description of the Bedouin judicial
process in action. Southall (1956:121-151) has drawn the
121 distinction between internal and external delicts on the
681 bases of kinds of sanctions rendered, and whether or not
114 chiefly authority mediates conflict. Such a distinction can
be only partially applied in the case of the Bedouins of the
Western Desert. The kind of sanctions operating in the internal
political system do differ from those applied in the external
political system, though not to the same degree which is true
121 of Southall's Alurland. On the other hand, since Bedouin
681 society, lacking political centralization, cannot be character-
692 ized as a segmentary state with distinct spheres of authority
642 at successive levels of the lineage structure, the intervention
or non-intervention of chiefly adjudication and decision-
making cannot serve as a basis for differentiating political
* [613] action. Rather, the lone political office of the 'agila
[621] involves itself in all arbitration which cannot be successfully
[648] concluded by the mechanism of familial authority. There are
just two exceptions which apply to this latter statement:

121 first, the government may enter into conflict cases which
681 are judged to be out of control and involving the larger tribal
692 units; secondly, litigants, whether exercising internal or
648 external political relations, have the right to take their
[626] case to a rajal khair. Both exceptions represent informal
processes of social control in al-Qasr: the first case rarely
happens, and the second case seems to occur quite frequently
but no recordings of the settlement are made.

681 Sanctions in the Bedouin legal system conform to what
121 Radcliffe-Brown referred to as secondary sanctions: "These
are concerned with the actions of persons or groups in their
effects upon other persons or groups" (1952:209). Also, it
[671] would seem that Bedouin law is one of private delicts as
opposed to a law of public delicts:

[692] In the procedure of a law of private delicts a person
or a body of persons that has suffered some injury, loss
or damage by infringement of recognized rights appeals
to a constituted judicial authority, who declares some
other person or body of persons within the community to
be responsible and rules that the defendant shall give
satisfaction to the plaintiff, such satisfaction fre-
quently taking the form of the payment of an indemnity
or damages. A private delict is thus an action which is
subject to what may be called a restitutive sanction
(Radcliffe-Brown 1952:213).

681 In Bedouin society, delicts are private since they involve
675 individuals or lineage groups, but the restitutive sanctions
671 to which they give rise are backed by communal consensus ex-
pressed through public approval in general, and by the twin

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671 charters of Bedouin society, the rawaabit al-'awaagil and
the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali. Again, following Radcliffe-Brown

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182 (1952:212-219), sanctions expressed in al-Qasr may be con-
sidered civil as opposed to criminal sanctions since, even in
the case of intentional homicide, the emphasis is upon resti-
tution and the restoration of the "good society" rather than

[67] upon punishment. The Bedouin legal system is one which deals
with private délits, and which depends upon secondary social
sanctions and ritual sanctions for the arbitration and settle-
ment of disputes.

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681 Since neither a dichotomy between private and public
délits nor a differential distribution of authority at the
various levels of the lineage structure obtain in the uncentral-
ized political system of the Bedouins, political action and
type of sanction will be described in terms of whether or not
they occur in the internal political system of the secondary
or domestic group, or in the external system where interaction
between secondary, primary, or tribal segments takes place.

The most striking difference between the two systems
of political action rests with the fact that the lex talionis,
retaliation regulated by custom, does not operate within the

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682 secondary group. In the two cases of killing between tertiary
groups of 'Ailit Ma'fas and 'Ailit Lazumi already given, com-
pensation was immediately paid: the incidents were both

* [613] settled and "forgotten." In conflict situations arising in the

• 121 external system, however, the law recognizes retaliation, a
681 life for a life. Still, even in this case, Bedouin values
682 expressed through the 'awaiyid try to avert bloodshed and
[182] feuding by showing "the good path" and providing the means
[677] for settlement through compensation.

681 Just as the Bedouin accepts the 'awaiyid as a set of
682 of ideals calculated to regulate conflict, he paradoxically
182 claims the right to impose retaliatory sanctions as a just
[671] conclusion to conflict. One Bedouin said that the greatest
[673] sin which a man or group can commit is to accept the diyya
and then take his blood-revenge and return the money. Pre-
sumably, a person or group commits no outrage if they refuse
the diyya with the understanding that blood-revenge will be
taken. In al-Qasr, retaliation and the 'awaiyid are mechanisms
[626] of social control and dispute settlement. A political office
[671] exists, i.e. the 'aqila which functions over the total range
* [613] of political action, and the process of adjudication and
[672] compensation in the form of indemnity payment represents an
institutionalized alternative to retaliation. In all cases
of dispute, ritual or religious sanctions back up social
sanctions. God is a third party to all conflict, and this is
[776] made manifest in the reading of the Fatiha or the oath-taking
[695] ceremony. In order to describe how authority and sanctions
128 operate in Bedouin society, a number of examples are presented
68 below. Some of the cases are the statements of informants about
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CHAPTER V

STRUCTURAL DIFFERENTIATION AND AUTHORITY

Political Role Analysis: Theoretical Framework

There is current confusion over the definition and use of concepts in political analysis. Ideas concerning power, influence, authority, and the general notion of leadership itself, are variously treated and dealt with equally well. But in every case, a necessary and common aspect of political studies is that of role analysis.

"Role" is that part of the actor's behavior which constitutes and defines his participation in the social interactive process (Parsons and Shils 1951:23). Political roles define who does what with respect to the political aspect of the social interactive process, i.e. in the system of authority relations. In a most general sense, political role structure may be divided into the two categories of "followers" and "leaders" (Leach 1954:8-10; Easton 1965:205). From the level of the family to the largest social grouping, persons are assigned by the group, or take it upon themselves, to make and help execute decisions. This is to say, that some degree of leadership exists in all social groupings. Whether or not such leadership is institutionalized is another question with which we shall

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571 deal in the course of this discussion.

No political system can persist without a separation of duties between decision-makers and others. The specialized function of decision-making in the political sphere helps "to bring about some adjustment or accommodation in conflicting demands and to implement any settlement where necessary" (Easton 1965:206). It follows then that there is no society without some type of authority role, however simple, and, we assume, that this role can be defined.

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571 I do not consider this point a debatable one, though writings on the subject of political organization in primitive society seem to indicate that I should consider it debatable. For example, Steward (1938:247) reports on small bands of American Indians in the Basin-Plateau region who are without chiefs (leaders?). Sharp (1958:5) states that the Yir Yoront cannot tolerate even "mild chiefs"; Schapera (1956:93) notes that "chiefs everywhere in South Africa" are only part-time specialists, and this is taken to mean that the Bushman and Bergdama are without political roles. Service (1966:51) defines "leadership" as "administration" and finds that it is unstructured, which moves from one person to another, and, above all, cannot be associated with the word "chief." All of these discussions consider specialization to mean full-time spent in role-playing and the singularity of role assignment. On these bases conclusions are reached as to the presence

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554 or absence of political roles in primitive societies. It is obvious that in no society does an individual play one, and only one, role. Every social role is, in some degree, a part-time role. Even at the apex of role specialization and structural complexity (the presidency of the United States, for instance), an individual plays his political role along with others. Also, in trying to determine the presence or absence of roles in a society, it should be kept in mind that the notion of institutionalization refers to a process and not a state of being. Therefore, in any one society at any one point in time, there may be a number of roles "happening." This, it seems, will especially be the case in the dynamic field of politics.

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554 In political analysis, influential and leadership
571 roles may be viewed in terms of differential responsibility. Authority is the institutionalization of a responsible relationship between the leader and other members of the collectivity wherein the former has the right to expect support from the latter in given situations (Parsons 1960:183-186). A role which is imbued with power, but not authority in the analytical sense which I wish to bring out here, lacks this institutionalized right to expect support. M.G. Smith (1966:127) makes this analytical distinction most clearly:

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As a regulatory capacity, authority is legitimated and identified by the rules, traditions, and precedents which embody it and which govern its exercise and objects. Power is also regulatory, but is neither fully prescribed nor governed by norms and rules.

Authority is always attached to specific roles while power is a generalized control over others. For instance, power may be based on religious or economic grounds and operate with equal influence in the political sphere. The basis of the legitimacy of authority is the backing which it receives from the legal system. Power, however, is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be able to carry out his will regardless of the basis on which this probability rests (Weber 1947:152). Power over others is a type of influence which may operate without their consent, their "will," or even their awareness and understanding. For instance, when one party controls property or other values essential to person's existence, he has power over those others (Goldhamer and Shils 1939).

Influence of the authority type is explicit and institutionalized control of certain symbols which emphasizes group goals. Power-type influence is the control of goods and symbols, often the inexplicit manipulation of these things, which emphasizes particularistic goals usually with a private individual referent. Power and authority are two types of influence. For analytical purposes, they may be considered at opposite ends of a scale of institutionalization. In this

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571 way, each may be considered as having aspects of the other
attached to it: a power role may at times take on an author-
itative aspect, and an authority role, when its incumbent
"pulls rank," may be said to be exerting power rather than
authority.

I have found it necessary to utilize the concepts
and ideas discussed here in order to understand the distribu-
tion of power in al-Qasr. The range of authoritative action
is wide in Bedouin society, and no simple dichotomy between
power and authority will suffice to explain it. However,
authority does crystallize at certain points in the al-Qasr
social structure, and political rights and duties at these
reference points become relatively formal and well-defined.
When we speak of the crystallization of authority roles, we
refer to a tendency toward legitimacy as a process of in-
stitutionalization taking place in society. Authority among
the 'Aishaibat tribe is legitimate, public, and representative
because it is distributed and exercised with reference to
imperatively coordinated associations, or corporate groups.
Furthermore, the manner in which authority is segmented and
distributed informs and legitimates the Bedouin lineage
structure. On the other hand, power and power roles possessing
no legitimate or representative influence with reference to
the lineage structure, may actually inform "structures" and
"modes" which combine and "are quite unlike the articulations

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in a lineage system" (Peters 1967:280).

My own study indicates that authority roles are more easily studied since they are more easily observable. Power roles are subtle simply because they are less institution-
alized; closer field work is required if we are to understand their structure and function. Al-Qasr is characterized by segmentation in communication structure which follows the lines of lineage segmentation. As a consequence of this, social intercourse is of a restricted nature wherein each lineage group tends to be its own audience. In cases such as these, where social interaction is anything but intense, the character of political relations between groups is difficult to perceive. Thus the operation of influence at the informal level, i.e. power, is difficult to comprehend. But it seems absolutely necessary that politics per se be studied in the tribal situation, and the only way that I can handle it in the al-Qasr case is to consider leadership in the context of an institutionalization process.

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There are precedents for this approach, and these also serve to point up the importance of leadership studies in primitive societies. Radcliffe-Brown (1940:xi-xxiii), referring to decision-making processes in tribal societies, was convinced that even in cases of contingencies, and seemingly "spur of the moment" group activities, careful observation would show that "they were directed by leaders who had some

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measure of recognized authority" (p. xv). Radcliffe-Brown conceived of politics as a process, and actually worked with concepts of increasing specialization in decision-making and role differentiation to bring this out (p. xxi). The structural focus of political analysis is the role: he reminds us that analytical concepts such as the "State" do not exist in the phenomenal world, that there exists only individuals who play roles and interrelate as possessors and non-possessors of authority (p. xxiii).

More recently, Pospisil (1968:201-222) has claimed that all societies necessarily possess authority roles by virtue of the fact that justice and its administration is "vested in the decision-making activity, irrespective of its informality or subtlety, of an individual or group of individuals of influence." According to Pospisil, law and conflict regulation upon which political order rests cannot be divorced from "the decision-making process of authority or group leaders" (1968:206). In his study of the Kapauku Papuans, Pospisil (1963:52-55) describes the basis of a "power" struggle between different "authorities."

In this study, I have tried to use the concepts of decision-making process, power-authority continuum, and role-structure for an analysis of Bedouin leadership. Such an approach may be better suited for a study of peasant or modern-complex societies where roles are more differentiated

- 121 and better defined, but I feel that the area of leadership
554 in tribal society is more complex and less well studied than
571 we are led to believe. Both the decision-making process and
some kind of authority are present in all societies, but we
know less about such universals in tribal society. It is as
Easton (1965:205) has said: "Even in the smallest group, we
can expect to find that the power and responsibility of caring
for recurring matters as well as crises tend to reside in the
hands of the few."

Status and Role Differentiation

- 554 Although structural differentiation along class lines
565 does not exist in al-Qasr, status differential does exist and
a discussion of it is essential for an understanding of Bedouin
authority structure. Classes exist only where individuals at
a specific socio-economic level "become conscious of their
common interests and organize themselves" (Linton 1936:110).
Status stratification in and of itself is not indicative
of a class structure, for "a size beyond the possibility of
facial recognition" is an additional prerequisite (Bierstedt
1957:404).

- 554 Authority structure in al-Qasr, like any of the other
571 structures of society, constitutes a system of roles. The
actors who act out the roles in this particular system occupy
a special status, or position, in the Bedouin social system

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the disputants. As noted, the rajal saalih shares this right with the 'agila. The rajal khair does not have recourse to this mechanism which amounts to divine approval of the binding decision of the "third party." 'Amm Salih in his discussion of the Bedouin moral code corroborated this point: "Any 'agila can read the Fatiha. In this way, he and the two parties involved terminate the quarrel. This is a way to show that all agree on the settlement. Originally, only the rajal saalih did this, but now the 'awaqil do it in all cases." It would be interesting to know if in Cyrenaica both roles perform this function or if it belongs only to the role of rajal salih.

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I cannot generalize concerning this role for the whole of the Western Desert. Sayyid al-Sanusi and 'Amm Salih seem to be special men. On the other hand, the 'agila and the rajal khair are roles which we would expect to find all over the desert, and in Libya also. The 'agila is the focus of institutionalized traditional authority structure, and the rajal khair and "status group" represent the power structure.

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This attempt to differentiate between authority and power is essentially one which deals with the more general problem of leadership. Any study of the structure of authority must have reference to the notion of leadership. Role analysis seems the best method of dealing with leaders and their functions. Role analysis together with the conceptualization of institution as a process is an adequate way of dealing with the tendency

554 toward legitimacy and the phenomenon of change in the
• 121 political structure. Peters (1967:271-279), in a long
awaited discussion of the political aspect of Cyrenaican
Bedouin society, adumbrates this problem of differentiating
between instituted authority and the distribution of power:

In order to discuss this adequately, a lengthy diversion
into an analysis of the distribution of power would be
necessary. . . there are men who wield power over
groups of varying populations, and the extent of their
domains cannot be understood by reference to orders in
the lineage. Perhaps it is for this reason--because,
that is to say, lineage theory effectively blocks the
exercise--that relatively little has been written about
the problem of leadership in these societies (i.e. lineage
societies).

554 Foci of power and authority change and at times
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[795] irrespectively of the lineage structure. The role of the
rajal saalih was more influential during the days of the
Sanusiyya movement than it is today. At that time, "holy
men" controlled economic, and thus political, relations
through the zawiya system: they were in a position to command
respect and obedience and could be considered a "status group"
in their own right. Today, "holy men" are rarely found among
the members of the "status group." As one informant phrased
it: "They used to solve problems more in the past than now.
People in the old days were not educated as they are today:

554 the mind of the son is larger than that of the father. In
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792 the past, the "holy man" was so important that were he to ask

If the office left the family,

all of the lineages would be fighting over it . . . The job should stay in Bait Bu Taram; if this is impossible, then it should stay in 'Ailit Lazumi. In any case, the 'awaagil will decide.

A change in the present locus of legal authority in the Bedouin-Egyptian government structural relationship would amount to a re-structuring process, and could lead to serious conflict. In the very least, it would call for a clear explanation and new statement of social reality since it would challenge what is, and "has always been," a legitimate distribution of power and political order.

The office of the shaikh is not a potential power-base by comparison with the office of 'umda. The shaikh, rather than being in direct communication with the Governor, executes the official orders made known to the 'umda. As an administrator, he takes care of issuing drivers' licenses, notifies men of their military draft status, etc. The government sees this as a necessary post because of the difficulty of contacting Bedouins deep in the desert. In one sense, the shaikh's office is becoming less functional as the Bedouin move in from the desert and begin to take part in the national society, but in another sense it is becoming more functional as bureaucracy and red tape become increasingly complex. But the shaikh remains in the shadow of the 'umda. He never substitutes for the 'umda, for this would infringe on the rightful power of the 'umda's family; when the 'umda is absent,

CHAPTER VI

AUTHORITY AND CHANGE: A CASE STUDY

Theoretical Orientation

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Eric Wolf (1956) was one of the first political analysts to perceive the importance of "the nation-oriented person," the nexus between the local community and the nation state, for a theory of culture change. He described the Mexican "broker" as a power-seeker:

An individual who seeks power and recognition outside his local community must shape his behavior to fit these new expectations . . . he must learn to function in terms which characterize any complex stratified society in which individuals can improve their status through the judicious manipulation of social ties . . . Individuals who are able to operate both in terms of community-oriented and nation-oriented expectations then tend to be selected out for mobility. They become the economic and political "brokers" of nation-community relations, a function which carries its own rewards (pp. 1071-1072).

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Wolf felt that the "brokers" provided the anthropologist with a key concept for the analysis of leadership in situations of change where local communities are being integrated into larger systems. The basic function of the "broker" is to relate community-oriented persons, "who wish to stabilize or improve their life chances, but who lack economic security

• 121 and political connections," with nation-oriented persons who operate at a national socio-cultural level of integration (1956:1075-1076).

Clifford Geertz (1960) has also examined the rôle of a "cultural broker" in Indonesia as an instance of "a vigorous, imaginative regional leadership, able to play a cultural middleman role between peasant and metropolitan life, and so create an effective juncture between traditional cultural patterns and modern ones" (1960:229). In the case of the Mexican "broker" described by Wolf, the major means of consolidating and obtaining power both at the regional and the national levels were through political channels. In the case of the Indonesian "broker," both religious and political channels are the means by which the local Muslim teacher, or kijaji, has obtained power: traditionally, he was a specialist in communication of Islam to the countryside, and today he has taken on the role of local party leader (Geertz 1960:230).

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557 In al-Qasr, the rajal khair seems to be the Bedouin counterpart of the Mexican and Indonesian "broker." With a firm economic base in the local community, and with his ability to adopt new patterns of public behavior, i.e., "he knows how to speak to the Governor and public officials," the role of rajal khair provides the means for one to move upwards through political channels (Wolf 1956:1071). Within the context of a newly emerging authority system based upon the

121 structural principle of bureaucracy, the rajal khair lacking
554 legitimacy in the traditional lineage-based system may en-
627 visage an authoritative role and increased chances to "improve
557 his status through the judicious manipulation of social ties."

121 Leadership studies in the context of cultural change,
554 such as those which deal with "broker" types, have important
178 implications for a more general and fundamental theoretical
problem: the role of the individual in culture and society.
Radin, as early as 1927, Redfield (1960), Geertz (1960),
Fallers (1964), and Mead (1964) have spoken of "primitive
philosophers," "the hinge group," "the cultural brokers,"
"the new men," and "the evolutionary clusters." All terms
have direct reference to role types constructed from the
observation of individuals possessed of the ability and
creativity to offer new ideas and methods of dealing with
the pressing cultural problems of their times. The unitary
goal of all these researchers was to understand culture
change through a focus on the way in which the individual
manipulates his cultural resources.

121 I would maintain that, especially in political analysis,
the approach and focus of the researcher is directly related
to his ontologic position concerning the concepts of culture
and human nature. That is to say, whether or not the researcher
believes that "man has no choice in life, that culture deter-
mines his behavior," then he will or will not find it relevant

• 121 to his problem to investigate something other than the structural categories of society; something such as ideas and other creative acts of leaders. It has been noted that leadership studies are lacking in the analyses of tribal societies. I find it no mere coincidence that this is also the area of research in which kinship, for the sake of kinship, has been studied and restudied. This is also the area of research in which, as Easton (1959) rightly notes, kinship analysis is erroneously identified with political analysis; in which social structures are elevated to the ontological level.

David Bidney (1953) has articulated the basic issue of the debate between "the superorganic evolutionists" and the "humanistic school," the former defending a theory of cultural determinism and the latter insisting upon freedom of thought and action for man. Since 1953, data have tended to support Bidney's claim in favor of cultural freedom, that culture may be investigated at different levels, and that, in fact, freedom of scientific thought is a prerequisite of any science of culture (1953:179). Other scientists concerned with both particular cultural problems and a general scientific theory of culture are increasingly in agreement with this position (see Geertz 1962 and 1964; Cohen 1962; Mackenzie 1967).

Leadership studies, it would seem, and the creative cultural dynamics of the "Third World" (Worsley 1964) certainly

• [2] bolster empirically Bidney's contention that

The traditional ... societies have suddenly awakened to a consciousness of their underdeveloped condition and have demanded and been granted, often reluctantly, the rights to control their own cultural destinies. The new watchword is Freedom--freedom from alien control and freedom to rule themselves and to participate more fully in the cultural achievements of mankind (1967).

The Era of the New Nations, more than any other period in history, supports the methodological imperative of "a culture" and "Culture" toward which the anthropologist must orient himself if he is ever to arrive at a valid conception of man, society, and cultural evolution. In the New Nations, cultural innovations have most certainly been introduced by individuals which "deliberately promote and encourage cultural progress" (Bidney 1967:xxvii).

I have suggested in another place (Obermeyer 1967:6) that a Weberian model of society, which takes cognizance of both objective and subjective reality, approaches the methodological needs which Bidney insists upon for a scientific theory of culture. Furthermore, Weber's model is directly related to his view of political action "which seeks to encompass both the very great limitations that every social situation imposes upon the individual and the great opportunities for action that are inherent in the instability of social

121 structures (Bendix 1962:261).¹ Structural analysis, to be sure, is essential but it is also important that we have an understanding of the process by which individuals strive for and achieve certain roles, and the various ways in which they "manipulate, and even create, elements of the culture that evaluates them" (Fallers 1963:163). The very antithesis of this approach is represented in a leadership study by Marshall Sahlins (1963) who, in view of his cultural deterministic ontologic position and his stress on purely structural features, comes to a predictable conclusion: "Perhaps we have been too long accustomed to perceive rank and rule from the standpoint of the individuals involved, rather than from the perspective of the total society" (p. 300). It seems hardly realistic to accuse anthropologists of ignoring social structure in pursuit of the creativity of the individual.

Both Wolf (1966) and Geertz (1960) have acknowledged the primary place of Robert Redfield's work in their conceptualization of culture change. Redfield (1953;1960; 1962) explained culture change by reference to a process involving the divergence and convergence of two ideal types, "the great

¹In connection with a considered synthesis of the theories of David Bidney and Max Weber, I have also suggested that the approach of the symbolic interactionist school of sociology may be useful. This school emphasizes that the individual reacts to social constraints not by conforming but by confirming the social structure. Interestingly enough, there are indications that Durkheim's thought was developing in the direction of symbolic interaction (see Stone and Farberman 1967).

121 tradition" and "the little tradition." The "little tradition" refers to peasant or folk culture, and the "great tradition" to a specialized and systematized body of thought which is, in most cases, esoteric, written, related to religion, and the property of an intellectual group (1960:40-59; 1962:302). Of course, Redfield's notion of a "literati" does not apply in the Bedouin case. But in an earlier work (1953:44) Redfield drew attention to the more general concept of "intelligentsia" which further refines the scope and types of leadership. Redfield refers to "the member of the intelligentsia . . . (who) belongs to two worlds, not one; he is a marginal man." He then goes on to differentiate between the "literati" type and the "intelligentsia" type, stating that the former type uses literacy to carry on the sacred tradition while the member of the "intelligentsia" may use literacy "to admit the ways of the world outside." While the rajal khair does not become the representative of the great and sacred tradition of Islam, he does utilize the bureaucratic means at hand to admit the outside world into al-Qasr. The rajal khair may be [591] considered a member of an "intelligentsia."

121 Gustave von Grunebaum (1962) has used Redfield's model of cultural dynamics to understand change and social mobility in the Arab World with special reference to Egypt. The author, an Islamicist, states that the "great tradition" of orthodox Islam in contrast to popular Islam is recognized as "the more

• 121 advanced" and is assumed "to have authority"; that the
"great tradition" is represented in the writings and public
actions of the political elite; and that "social prestige is
dependent on its adoption (or at least on its profession)"
(1962:69). Implicit in von Grunebaum's analysis, and also
contained in Redfield's model, is the employment of reference
group theory to understand human behavior in society. In
the al-Qasr case, I have tried to show that "status group"
members repudiate many of the traditional ways of life while
at the same time identifying more and more with the Egyptian
"status group," the bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh. The im-
plication here is that the Bedouin "status group" is in the
process of taking on the values of a new reference group to
which they do not yet belong but to which they seek admission.

The bureaucrats of Marsa Matruh, like those of Cairo
and Alexandria described by von Grunebaum, represent the
"great tradition." The "status group" of al-Qasr while
aspiring to the "great tradition" emulate certain of the
behavioral traits and expectations of the elite group. For
instance, they are conspicuous for their regular attendance
at Friday mosque services in Matruh. Merton, who has developed
reference group theory, points out that "men frequently orient
themselves to groups other than their own in shaping their
behavior and evaluations" (1957:234). This type of behavior,
or "anticipatory socialization," is the process of taking on

121 the values of a non-membership group in order to "find readier
177 acceptance by that group and make an earlier adjustment to
571 it" (Merton 1957:265). In a relatively closed society such as
181 al-Qasr, when those who qualify for membership in other
reference groups are able to do more than merely aspire, when
they actually anticipate and adjust their behavior to a type
of status consciously desired, the local authority and social
structures are likely to be transformed.

121 We can generalize from the literature on social
571 stratification that the hierarchial structure characteristic
554 of traditional societies carries with it a relationship of
mutual obligation. The "inferior" owes rent, respect, loyalty,
obedience, etc., while the "superior" owes, in return, pro-
tection, advice, help in emergency, action in conflict regula-
tion, representation in extralocal matters, etc. (Hagen 1962:

121 55-86; Parsons 1953: 108). In al-Qasr, the 'aqila fulfills
554 only one of the functions of the "superior," that which deals
* [613] with conflict regulation. The rajal khair role, as I have
[627] developed it, may function in full capacity as a "superior."

121 The rajal khair dominates the internal system through power
554 derived from rank on the prestige scale: he is prominent in
627 the external system as member and representative of a new
power structure based on national and political consciousness.
Traditionally, rajal khair-dominance was not by force but
through influence and prestige: in the new situation, with a

121 fully organized government behind the role, the element of
554 force may enter into the rajal khair style of domination.
627 Thus far, the 'umda and the shaikh roles have functioned
634 through the traditional roles of the 'aqila and the rajal
* 613 khair, that is, the "status group." In the future, this pattern
178 may change. It is also possible that new roles will emerge.
This is what I wish to explore.

121 The "status group" of al-Qasr operating with a sense
571 of identity with a modern reference group deem themselves
554 responsible for making decisions on the behalf of "the people"
or "the Bedouin." Members of the "status group" would
177 occasionally dress in Western clothes; they would hunt gazelle
for sport; they owned the few autos there were in the area;
and a few partook of alcoholic beverages. Their rights and
obligations in social relations are still relatively stable
and depend on the ascribed values of al-Qasr Bedouin society,
but one can detect the start of a power struggle within the
group. It is a competitive desire for social mobility and
is stated in terms of the achieved attributes considered
important by the reference group to which they aspire, the
Egyptian society. For example, one sometimes heard the com-
plaint from various members of the "status group" that the
Governor was not giving proper recognition to those "who
understood the ways of the Bedouin," and "those who could
speak for the Bedouin."

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156 My approach here is to state the problem of authority and change using a case study of one man whom I consider the most prestigious member of the "status group" of al-Qasr. He is a member of the "status group" by virtue of his wealth and family connections; he has reinforced and enhanced his "status honor" by the practice of intervening into various conflict situations and mustering support, favors, and loyalty as he goes; and he has proved his "superiority" by excelling in the outside business world. All this he has done while remaining a "good Bedouin."

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156 The name of Hajj 'Ali appeared time and time again as my research progressed and increasingly concentrated on the authority structure.² I asked questions which required the informants to name a person in al-Qasr to whom he would go if he needed help, money or advice. I asked: "Who is the leader of the Bedouin?"; "Who knows the wants and needs of the Bedouin most intimately?" On the basis of the data collected [571] in this manner, I was able to perceive a "status group" and gain an idea of the real leaders of al-Qasr. It also gave me a working knowledge of the local role structure. Hajj 'Ali's name came up with the highest frequency in the questionnaires, and my observations and interviews with him corroborated his central place in the authority structure.

[126] I also recorded the life history of Hajj 'Ali's son, and gained valuable insights from this data.

²The name, Hajj 'Ali, is of course a pseudonym.

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121 I know that Hajj 'Ali consciously and actively seeks to be a leader among the Bedouin, that he seeks a place in the new governmental structure in Marsa Matruh, and hence that he desires power, however benevolent his intentions may be. In what follows, I hope to bring this out by presenting Hajj 'Ali as himself and as a "cultural broker."

When I say that Hajj 'Ali desires power I mean nothing derogatory. Power-seeking is a kind of social phenomenon which characterizes man-in-society around the world: the quest occurs in primitive and modern groups, and university structures alike (Moore 1958:1-30). Hajj 'Ali's desire for power, and also authority, has not wrought change in the whole structure of the al-Qasr social system. As we shall see, Hajj 'Ali is discontent with the present structure of al-Qasr and feels that the Bedouins must accept change. His discontent is related to the changing conditions in and about al-Qasr; the chance to express it or re-channel it, at this time, derives from his ascribed place in the al-Qasr system. Whether his desire for power is a result or a cause of his discontent I cannot tell. Only a personality study in depth could answer this question.

In terms of this study, one way to look at Hajj 'Ali's case is to view it as his attempt to convert power in the internal system into authority in the external system. But in this context "external" refers to the national level rather

156 than the Awlad 'Ali societal level. In the traditional
554 system, his influence and power have been informal, and,
• 121 although this has been advantageous over against the formal
role of 'aqila, his political activity was ultimately limited
by this structural differentiation and definition of authority.

[177] In gaining access to the bureaucratic structure of Egyptian
officialdom with its firm allocation of rights and duties,
Hajj 'Ali could operate as an authority within the total authority
structure which has reference to both the internal and external
political relational systems of al-Qasr.

Practical Application

*613 In al-Qasr, the two most influential and powerful
lineages, 'Ailit Lazumi and 'Ailit Ma'fas, each have a
[634] "most powerful bait." We have noted that in 'Ailit Lazumi
it is Bait Bu Taram which controls the office of 'umda: in
*613 'Ailit Ma'fas it is Bait 'Umar which has Hajj 'Ali. Hajj 'Ali
159 is fifty three years old. He has married five times, divorced
581 one wife, and at present has four wives. Whatever his motives
156 for these marriages, at least some of them have obviously
[595] been made as economic and political moves. A check on his
wives' tribal origins will show this. In each case, Hajj
'Ali's wife is from a lineage which holds land contiguous to
his own property in the 'izba sector of al-Qasr. The one
exception to this is a marriage contracted to establish ties

156 administrative business took up most of the time at the
159 meeting, and only the Governor and the Egyptians took part
554 in the discussion. At the conclusion of the meeting, the
635 Governor asked if any present had comments to make. Hajj
648 'Ali rose, and delivered a formal and well-prepared speech
[871] on the inadequacies of the educational facilities in Matruh.
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He noted that the Governor had promised the Bedouins that if they sent their sons in from the desert for secondary schooling, their material needs would be taken care of, but that in fact the Governor had not kept his promise for there was not enough space and beds for the boys. The Governor apologized for this condition and said he was trying to correct it. I noted that a few Egyptians found something amusing about this incident, but that all of the Bedouins present were serious and nodded in agreement with the points made by Hajj 'Ali.

156 We should note that Hajj 'Ali was the only Bedouin to
159 speak up at the meeting, that he spoke in the formal, tradi-
554 tional manner, and that he showed concern for the real problems
635 of the Bedouins. Hajj 'Ali is careful to protect his identity as a Bedouin, and in this he differs from the 'umda and most of the "status group."

121 In situations of induced change, the cultural problems
156 involved differ in their conception and immediacy as defined
159 by the agents and the recipients of change. Hajj 'Ali, who
554 is both an agent and a recipient of change, is intimate with
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121 the problems of the Bedouins of al-Qasr. He knows how to
156 phrase them, and his place on the Majlis al-Muhafza gives
159 him the right and the opportunity to air them. This is the
554 role of the "cultural broker." Before the meeting of the
635 council, Hajj 'Ali had gathered a group of the men from al-
177 Qasr and they had talked about which demands should be pre-
sented to the Governor. This is purely a political process
which Hajj 'Ali manipulates. The formulation and presentation
(E48) of demands became, in the hands of Hajj 'Ali, "inputs" into
the Egyptian political system with the hope that they will
materialize as "outputs" and the satisfaction of needs -
to use the terminology of David Easton's "systems analysis"
(1965b).

156 On another occasion, Hajj 'Ali demonstrated his
159 status and political leadership and the fact that he has
554 assumed the position of spokesman for the Bedouin of al-Qasr
635 during this period of change. Once each year the Governor
177 makes a tour of al-Qasr to inspect the school, the cooperative
building, the government experimental farm, and the area in
general. After the inspection tour, he holds a reception in
a ceremonial tent set up for the occasion. At this time, he
states his evaluations and opinions, distributes some clothing
material to the poorer families of the area, and asks for
suggestions from the Bedouins who sit on the ground before the
tent. The only suggestion forthcoming from the Bedouins was

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and they sat on chairs inside the tent. I returned to
Marsa Matruh in the 'umda's car (1964 Ford, highly polished)
with the 'umda and the shaikh. They openly joked about Hajj
'Ali and his manner of presentation; they repeated some of
his "stilted" phrases and laughed. Hajj 'Ali gave last year's
reception speech also. This is because, his son says, Hajj
'Ali is considered a fine speaker by the Bedouins of al-Qasr.

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We can see how these details carry larger implications
within the context of political and social structures under-
going change. It is the stuff which the anthropologist finds
important for an understanding of the process of change.

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If I have established thus far that Hajj 'Ali is
politically active and representative in both the traditional
and the modern systems, then the attempt is now to prove that
he consciously seeks to change the traditional in the direction
of the modern for political and moral reasons, and for social
and personal reasons.

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Hajj 'Ali, when he spoke with me, inevitably came
around to the subject of international politics, whether this
was the question of Israel or the image which America's racial
problems presented. Hajj 'Ali was the only man from the whole
Marsa Matruh area who was neither shaikh nor 'umda to attend
the nomination of Jamal Abd al-Nasser in January of 1965. In
all of this, I detect a move on the part of Hajj 'Ali to
identify himself with an Egyptian reference group and to

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

121 In this study I have attempted to understand and
128 to describe the structure and process of Bedouin society
105 in al-Qasr by utilizing the data of politics. The primary
assumption of the study has been that political analysis must
proceed along lines which give recognition to, and focus upon,
the centrality of the concept and structure of authority and
the way in which it contributes to an orderly social process.
This study has dealt with the structure and function of
authority and, as much as possible, its theory and practice
in both contemporary and historical Bedouin society. Authority
in al-Qasr is intimately tied up with the system of rights
and obligations obtaining between individuals which is ex-
pressed through a structure of social roles. At another
level of social organization, the rights and obligations
inherent in a structure of authority inform a segmentary
lineage system. Part of this study aims to understand and
to underline the organizational principles from which the
Bedouins of al-Qasr derive their meaning of authority, social
roles, and social interaction.

In the first part of the study some of the general

128 historical aspects and specific economic facts of the Bedouin
105 social process were made explicit. The intention of the first

121 two chapters was to indicate the scope and dynamics of
culture change now occurring through the growth of a market
economy and the expansion of political awareness in al-Qasr.
The economic transformation of Bedouin society and the move
towards political integration into the larger Egyptian
society are, more and more, reflected in a shift from dependence
upon communal-based social ties to associative relationships
based upon private landholding, individual competitive par-
ticipation in the national economy and profit-keeping, and
new rights and obligations brought on by the activities of
national and provincial level politics.

The first part of this study also sought to understand
the meaning of social change in al-Qasr. Due to historical
experiences and ecological factors, social structure and
social change carry different meanings for the Bedouin
recipients and the Egyptian agents of change. In some cases,
it was seen, it is even dubious that Egyptian officials are
responding to the felt needs of the Bedouins. As background
to a later discussion of authority and change, we tried to
understand what the felt needs of the Bedouins are at this
time. One aspect of this problem was to define the traditional
units of Bedouin society as opposed to the modern administrative
units, and to consider change in light of this contrast. My

128 concern with the nature of al-Qasr's past not only helps us
105 to understand the Bedouin present but should also help us
121 to conceive of the Bedouin future. What data I was able to
collect concerning the historical development of the Bedouin
authority structure and its place in the economic transforma-
tion of Bedouin society relate to the later discussion of the
ascribed nature of leadership roles and the probability that,
in the future, access to political roles will become a matter
of individual achievement and a heightened awareness of things
political. In connection with this we saw that the Governor
of Marsa Matruh through the institution of new bureaucratic
structures, such as the Governor's Council and new electoral
guidelines, is fostering political change in this direction.

Although the largest part of this study dealt with
the political aspect of traditional roles and structures,
the contention was that traditional complexes are increasingly
unable to deal with the cultural problems of the day. This
applies to economic as well as political structures, as the
first part of this study is intended to show. But among
the New Nations and, in particular, whenever we are dealing
with tribal and peasant communities, "the most striking changes
have been the decline in the authority of the elders in terms
of both community and family organization . . . (because) the
life experience of the elders . . . is at best only partially
relevant to the current needs) (Halpern 1967:123).

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● 121 Authority represents and maintains a legitimate political order and an allotment of power. Without a system of authoritative norms, conflict could not be restrained and no social system could survive (Parsons 1960:183). As the concept of authority and its meaning undergo change so also do the appropriate structures and the power distribution between persons and groups change. The structure and dynamics of authority in al-Qasr were investigated through an analysis of the categories and interrelations of the Bedouin segmentary lineage system. This analysis was based primarily upon a definition of the organizational concepts and principles of Bedouin society such as unilineal rule of descent, residence, cognation, and contractual agreement and alliance.

While knowledge of these structural principles is fundamental to an understanding of Bedouin society, it was noted that a strict reliance on them would tend to limit one's understanding of politics in al-Qasr since they in fact conceal the nature of power and the functioning of semi-institutionalized roles. Nevertheless, these structural principles are informed by a set of key beliefs and values which are inculcated during the socialization process, and in a complementary way all of these concepts lend support to a corporate structure of authority. This corporate structure of authority which was discussed in terms of the concept and leadership role, or office, of 'aqila was claimed to be the

128 basis of social control in traditional Bedouin society. To
105 a large extent the corporate authority structure in al-Qasr
● 121 is still intact but is undergoing change at this time. Change
of the rule of consensus and the way in which it has reference
to traditional principles of organization for the regulation
of politics is the subject of the final two chapters in this
study.

The unilinear principle and its corollary, the corporate group, were defined as the basis for the structural division of Bedouin society into groups. Within the context of a traditional struggle for ecological advantage and a growing participation in the modern political process of interest group conflict, the lineage groups of al-Qasr were considered as political, or authority, groups. The membership and boundaries of these political groups parallel those of structures formed through an alliance of tertiary segments of the lineage system which is itself sanctioned by the rules of unilineality, marriage, residence, and adherence to a legal and moral code known as the rawaabit al-'awaaqil ("the bonds of the wise men"). The central political notion of Bedouin society, and the one which converts a kinship group into a political group, is that of 'aqila. The 'aqila principle, which is manifest in the role of the corporate leader, refers to both the idea of collective responsibility and to a politically instituted office. The concept of 'aqila is essential to an understanding

128 of internal social control and political group interaction
105 in Bedouin society. In order to grasp the meaning of 'aqila
• 121 in Bedouin society it was necessary to explore something of
the history of the concept.

Max Weber (1947:143-145) has drawn attention to the political significance of collective responsibility and the way in which it is related to the concepts of corporate leadership and self-help (blood-revenge) in traditional societies such as the Bedouins of al-Qasr represent: "All are held responsible for the action of any one . . . (and) the action of certain members, the 'representatives,' may be binding upon the others." Blood-revenge, or the law of self-help, is an instance of regulation through convention, and this practice, Weber claims, leads to "solidarity." Weber further claims, and is supported by the evidence which I present here concerning the concept of 'aqila, that we are likely to find a representative office especially where money must be collected and administered in the interest of the group (p. 145).

In modern political anthropology, Evans-Pritchard was the first to clearly equate kinship relations with political relations: he conceived of kinship groups as political conflict groups within the framework of a balanced opposition between structurally and ideologically similar units (1940:190). I have obviously found this conceptualization of tribal

128 politics very helpful, but the major emphasis of my study was
● 121 the authority structure rather than the kinship structure.

105 Authority was considered in terms of two aspects, both of
which tell us something about kinship structure: in one
way authority is the property of relations which obtain
between persons and roles of a group, and it acts to define
the structural boundaries and to secure the structural con-
tinuity of the group; in another way, authority is the property
of a tertiary group expressed at the secondary level of the
lineage structure and represented by the office of 'aqila.

In this last sense, authority defines the group vis a vis
other groups and acts to promote political order in society.

Authority, in view of these two aspects, was described as
operating at the various levels of the lineage structure,
i.e., the familial, the internal and external levels. I
sought to clarify the discussion by defining concepts and
roles which characterize authority and political action at
these various levels. One role, the shaib, which functions
solely at the familial level of the authority structure
was described; the fully institutionalized authority role
of 'aqila was analyzed as were a number of only partly insti-
tutionalized roles, or power roles. The most important of
these power roles was seen to be that of the rajal khair.
The institutionalized roles, and this includes the shaib
or head of the household, were described as functioning

128 according to public expectational patterns while the non-
● 121 institutionalized roles, being by definition less impinged
105 upon by structural norms, could function outside these
patterns. This distinction between types of roles was
seen to be the basis of the rajal khair's ability to manipu-
late persons and events in a play for power. These three
levels of authority were factored out from one another solely
for analytical reasons. In reality, the one shades into the
other: the authority of the shaib at times overlaps with that
of the 'aqila, and the power of the rajal khair and rajal salih
at time impinge upon, and detract from, the rightful influence
of both the shaib and the 'aqila. Role analysis, as it is used
in this study, I consider one of the most important methods
available for an investigation of a political problem.

Through political role analysis it was shown that the
role of 'aqila is the most important for an understanding of
the structure and functioning of Bedouin society. Political,
or authority, groups are defined in terms of the presence or
absence of this role; hence the whole political structure
proceeds from this concept. The legitimacy of the 'aqila,
and therefore the legitimacy of the political order which
obtains, stems from an explicit legal agreement among members
of the tertiary and secondary groups known as the rawaabit al-
'awaagil. These bonds are a contract between the 'aqila and
the other members of the corporate group, a mutual pact which

128 sets forth the rights and duties of the political office and
● 121 the corporate members. The duplication and reciprocal honor-
105 ing of this contract by tertiary groups related, in fact or
fiction, according to the unilineal principle gives rise to
a political alliance of groups who are viewed as "one corporate
body" at the secondary level of the lineage structure by all
outsiders. Structural relations between secondary groups in
Bedouin society are chartered in accordance with the several
principles of social organization, such as marriage, contract,
residence, and also according to the process of conflict control.

Actual conflict in al-Qasr usually takes place between
secondary groups even though it is sometimes expressed as
conflict between primary or tribal groupings. Coalition for
the attainment of political goals and the process of conflict
control at the supra-tertiary levels of the lineage hierarchy
depend upon the recognition of mutual usefulness and a common
means for settling disputes and re-establishing social harmony.
The problem-solving device which assures the conditions of an
orderly social process is the system of Bedouin customary law,
a set of legal and moral norms (Fortes and Evans-Fritchard
1940:20), known as the 'awa'iyid Awlad 'Ali ("the customs of
the sons of 'Ali").

The customary law of the Bedouins of al-Qasr was
described and a number of case studies occurring at the
various levels of the lineage and authority structure was

128 presented. According to the moral and legal norms of the
121 Bedouins, conflict control is effected formally and informally.
105 A primary value of Bedouin society instructs all men to
mediate conflict whenever possible lest quarrels spread to
involve more people and a wider loss of rights. Redress of
wrongs takes place through the intervention of, what were
defined as, either a mediator at the informal level or an
arbiter at the formal level of conflict control. If neither
of these peace-making mechanisms is invoked, or should both
fail in their attempt to restore social harmony, then the law
of self-help, or blood-revenge, may operate. This method of
controlling conflict is, according to most of the Bedouins,
to be avoided at all costs.

The notion of the "third party" to conflict was de-
veloped in this study. It was pointed out that in the case
of the triadic relationship in conflict control it is the
rajal khair or the rajal salih who usually becomes involved,
and that this role has the right to mediate but not to judge.
This is in fact the distinction which the Bedouins themselves
make between the roles of arbiter-'aqila and mediator-"third
party." This differentiation between political roles is
equivalent to a distinction between formal authority and
informal power.

In order to further explicate the political role-set
in Bedouin society a classificatory distinction was made

128 between traditional roles and modern legal roles; the former
121 category included the 'aqila, the rajal khair, and rajal salih,
105 while the latter was made up of the 'umda and the shaikh. The
roles of 'umda and shaikh have been historically imposed upon
the Bedouins from without and thus were not viewed as indigenous
to the al-Qasr political system. The role classification used
here, which is borrowed from the work of Max Weber, is purely
analytical for in reality both of the modern legal roles
figure importantly in any complete treatment of Bedouin
authority and its structure. All of the role-players who make
up the internal and external authority structures of al-Qasr
were considered to be members of a "status group" who possess
high "status-honor" which is based upon family and wealth and,
to a lesser extent in modern times, age.

Finally, the concept of the "cultural broker" was
introduced in an attempt to delineate the nature of political
change in al-Qasr. In the last chapter of the study the case
study of Hajj 'Ali was used to develop the idea of "cultural
broker." In some ways, the first five chapters of this study
serve as a background to the discussion of Hajj 'Ali as a
"cultural broker." The dynamics of the historical, economic,
and political situations, the changing meanings of kinship
concepts and other structures, and the growing tendency to
trust secular as opposed to sacred and traditional authority,
all of these factors converge to attach importance and immediacy

128 to an understanding of the role of "cultural broker" in the
121 present and future of al-Qasr.
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Hajj 'Ali provided us with an example of the secularization of traditional society. This process has been described as one "whereby men become increasingly rational, analytical, and empirical in their political action (Almond and Powell 1966:24). A number of the critical attitudes held by Hajj 'Ali had to do with the Bedouin conception of marriage, law, and authority; in each case it was seen that he questioned the legitimacy of Bedouin tradition and, eventually, would like to steer the Bedouins of al-Qasr away from this world view into the larger Egyptian political community. Besides Hajj 'Ali's discontent with the 'awaiyid Awlad 'Ali and other Bedouin customs, it was suggested that he desired change in al-Qasr's traditional structures and ideas because of his own design upon higher status and authority in the Egyptian bureaucracy of Marsa Matruh, a reference group with which all members of the "status group" identify.

What is happening in the case of Hajj 'Ali and al-Qasr is a sign of the times as far as the New Nations are concerned. The growing need for centralization in order to compete on the international market transforms the traditional structures of the New Nations whenever and wherever it must. But this process is not just a matter of induced change; it is not a one-sided affair. Inherently, any social structure,

128 including "traditional" ones, is a dynamic mechanism for the
• 121 solution of cultural problems. Related to this is the fact
105 that the individuals who manipulate these mechanisms are
creative and responsive agents of change themselves. The
need for central coordination and cooperation with national
governments sets the stage and provides the stimuli for new
cultural responses and devices which result in novel and
creative internal reorganization and reintegration around
new cultural patterns (Moore 1958:1-28). The case of Hajj
'Ali illustrates the beginnings of such a reorganizational
process in al-Qasr.

The main objective striven for in this study deals
with only one aspect of the problem of change in the New
Nations, but it is an important aspect: all politically-
oriented researchers should try to explain the legitimacy and
the dynamics of authority and structure in society. In my
particular case, discussion centered on lineage theory and
its corollary the corporate group, and authority was treated
in terms of political role analysis and local leadership patterns.
Change was viewed almost wholly as an endogenous process, but
the importance of exogenous forces was not played down. It
was claimed that an essential part of the "cultural broker"
role was to legitimate the authority of the nation-state in
order to effect change and legitimate his own authority role.

Conflict control was seen as a life-long process. As

128 culture change takes place, new bases for conflict arise and
121 new devices for control come into being. Politics was viewed
105 as the process of problem solution by the group, from the
family level to the total societal level. Politics involves
the struggle for, and the legitimation of, power, and functions
to bring about some kind of an ideological adjustment between
political groups: "Systems of beliefs are made in the image
of an idealized home, and there one loves and obeys one's
parents, loves the remaining members of the family, and treats
all other persons as outsiders" (De Grazia 1948:49).

A struggle for power characterizes Bedouin society as
it does any other human society. Equality in al-Qasr, as in
all human societies, is an ideal and only an ideal. Inequality,
in reality, persists and structures the patterns and issues
of conflict in Bedouin society. There are possessors and non-
possessors of property and wealth: there are possessors and
non-possessors of "status honor." Consequently, there are
possessors and non-possessors of authority, for authority
derives from property and "status honor." But in al-Qasr,
and in every human society, property is not the singular
prerequisite of "status honor" and authority. (In this
sense, one fundamental aspect of Marxian theory is totally
incorrect.) We saw in the cases of 'Amm Salih the "holy
man" and the prospective 'aqila of Bait Braik, that authority
is determined in terms of a complex of structural and ideational

128 factors. Nevertheless, in al-Qasr inequality does exist and
121 is related to an unequal distribution of authority between
105 individuals and groups, and the important point is that this
is the basis of conflict. As culture change proceeds along
with al-Qasr's need to be integrated into the national society,
the threat to the traditional distribution of power and
authority will foster new patterns of conflict; new means for
dealing with conflict will also have to be found. Creative
individuals such as Hajj 'Ali will have a hand in the new
processes of conflict control and cultural invention. Traditional
patterns of conflict and political structures provide
meaning and a semblance of stability to al-Qasr society, but
when conformity to political values becomes relative to motives
of expediency, when politics become secularized, then instability
and change in structures follow. And traditional concepts
must be redefined and reevaluated to cope with the new conditions.

121 In the case of the New Nations, political change seems
to be reflected in a shift from traditional organizational
principles to a modern bureaucratic principle which entails
a higher differentiation in the political structure. And,
as Fortes (1953:24) has noted, unilinear descent groups. such
as the Bedouins of al-Qasr, tend to break down when specialization
sets in.

The notion of viewing social change in terms of a
shift to the bureaucratic structural principle is not, of

121 course, original with this study. It was the basis of Weber's (1947) treatment of social change and was one of the conceptual points of his secularizational process. Firth (1961:50) spoke of this bureaucratization process as involving the recognition of new problems and the need for "extra-organizational" roles and decision-makers to deal with them. Gluckman (1963:78) noted that in the future social ties and cleavages, fission and fusion processes, will be studied in the context of modern bureaucratic politics.

The problem of social and political transformation is what I consider the most important province of the modern anthropologist. It is a problem which demands investigation at the local community level, in both the real and the ideal, the scientific and the native, sense of the term. Such investigations should aim at answering the questions so well stated by May Edle in the case of Uganda (1965:358):

To what degree are the boundaries of the moral community--the group within which common moral fellowship is acknowledged--changing, becoming wider and more inclusive . . . To what extent are (new factions) a tribal legacy deeply rooted in the divergent loyalties and institutions of the past, and destined to be a genuine source of long-range difficulty in Africa?

ABSTRACT

THE QUEST FOR ORDER AMONG AWLAD ALI
OF THE WESTERN DESERT OF EGYPT

By

Safia K. Mohsen

121 The study deals with the ways in which disputes are settled
128 within a tribal society with no centralized authority. One way these
[67] disputes are settled is through the application of a set of formal
rules known as "the daraieb" or the tribal ways. These rules are
kept in force through an elaborate, yet informal, judicial process
in which the local political leaders play a key role.

The main focus of the study is not the rules themselves, but
rather the ways they are implemented. More specifically, the study
examines the ways in which judicial reasoning is related to certain
realities of the social and political life of the group. Using mainly
the case-study method, this relationship is examined.

The first part of the thesis provides an account of the historical
and ecological features of the groups total context of action. This
is followed by a rather detailed analysis of the tribal organization
of the group. In dealing with the tribal organization two modes of
analysis are employed. A structural form of analysis which focuses
on the hierarchy of groups and subgroups by which the tribal members
order themselves; and a description of these groups in terms of the
processes through which they are maintained. In this context, special
[Introductory, P. V]

121 attention is paid to the nature of political leadership; the domains
128 within which the leaders function, the bases of their political
support and how all these are related to their role in dispute settle-
ment.

Through the analysis of cases some of the salient features of
the process of judicial reasoning are examined in the remaining part
of the thesis. Distinction is made here between cases involving
personal injuries and those arising from contractual relationships.

Finally, a concluding chapter summarizes the main findings of
the study.

[Introductory, p. vi]

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Chapter I

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The Comparative Studies of Law

This study is based on field work carried out among Awlad Ali, of the Western Desert of Egypt, between August 1965 and August 1966. The study deals with the processes by which order is maintained within a tribal society with no centralized authority. One way that order is maintained is through the application of a set of formal rules known to the people of the area as "the daraieb" or the tribal ways. These rules are kept in force by an elaborate, yet informal, judicial process in which the tribal political leaders play the most important part.

The main focus of the study is not the rules themselves but rather the ways in which they are implemented, or the judicial process. More specifically, the study deals with the ways in which the process of dispute settlement is related to certain realities of the social and political life of the group.

Concern with the legal systems of non-literate societies has been an interest of anthropologists since the classical monographs of the nineteenth century (Maine 1861, 1871; and Fustel de Coulanges 1864), directed the attention of anthropologists to the laws of ancient civilizations. Those monographs were followed at a later date by the work of anthropologists such as Malinowski (1926), Hogbin (1934), and Schapera (1938). In more recent years most anthropological work on legal systems has been done in Africa. Most notable among these are Gluckman's treatise on the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia (1955, 1963), Bohannan's account of the Tiv of Nigeria (1957), and Howell on the Nuer Law (1954). Other studies of primitive law

in other parts of the world include Llewellyn and Hoebel on the Cheyenne (1941), Pospisil's analysis of the Kapauku Papuan Ia (Pospisil 1958), Smith and Roberts' description of the Zuni law (1954) and Laura Nader's work on Zapotec law.

Despite this interest in the comparative study of legal institution among anthropologists, yet the fields of legal anthropology still lacks a coherent body of theory to bear upon the analysis of the institutions described. The theoretical questions represented in most of these writings seem to center around two main problems: the problem of definition, and that of methodology. With regard to the problem of definitions the various writers seem to be influenced by one or the other of two main schools of jurisprudence: the analytical school and the sociological school. The analytical school flourished in the late nineteenth century following the writings of its leader, John Austin, the British jurist. According to the analytical school law is a set of rules imposed upon society by a sovereign will. The picture is that of a supreme authority standing high above society and issuing its command downwards. This supreme authority is the creator and the ultimate source of law. These views are exemplified in Austin's famous definition of law as "a rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having the power over him" (1885: 316-7). Since the will of that political superior has to be exact, the only way to express it, according to Austin, is by means of legislation. According to the views of this school, the existence of a supreme authority is a prerequisite to the existence of law. Any social rules of observances existing before or without the issuing authority are not considered law. This excludes from being law rules which were not enacted such as the British common law, as well as all forms of primitive customary law.

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Later, members of the analytical school shifted the emphasis of their definition of law from its enactment by a supreme authority to its enforcement by that authority. Salmond defined law by reference to a court. Law, according to him, is "the body of principles recognized and applied by the state in the administration of justice" (1946:41). Gray, another member, went even further to deny the name, law, to a statute until it has been used as a basis of decision by the court (1921:82). Similarly, Diamond, who has contributed to the study and appreciation of 'primitive' law, hardly goes beyond arguing that societies without courts have no laws (Diamond 1935).

The influence of the analytical school on the anthropological writings on law is reflected in two ways. In the first place, it led some writers to maintain that since primitive societies lacked a supreme authority in the Austinian sense, they had no rules that may be called 'legal' and that among these societies "custom is the King" (Seagel 1941:111). In the second place, the concept of the court as stated by members of the analytical school seems to influence to a greater or lesser degree the definition of law by many anthropologists, a point which will be discussed later in the chapter.

The sociological school of jurisprudence came as a reaction against limitations inherent in the analytical school with its glorification of the supreme will. According to the views of this school, law develops within society of its own vitality. It is not an artificial creation of a supreme will but is spontaneous and independent of any formal authority. These views do not exclude the notion of enforcement of law by a supreme authority which becomes necessary as the society reaches a certain level of complexity, but unlike the analytical school, the supreme authority in the latter case is not the creator of law but a creation of it.

The movement was led by Von Savigny, the French jurist who viewed law as a rule existing for the purpose of regulating the actions of the

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individual in the interest of the whole community (1937). He regarded law as one of the many factors of the morphology of society. Roscoe Pound continued that tradition in his famous article, "The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence" (1910-11), in which he viewed law as "one side of the process of social control...a task or great series of tasks of social engineering." The purpose of law, according to Pound, is to eliminate friction and waste in the satisfaction of the human needs (1910-11;591-619).

To turn from jurists to anthropologists, we find the list of those who subscribe to the sociological view quite extensive. To try to enumerate them would be a very lengthy endeavor. Malinowski states that law and order arise out of the very process which they govern. He sees laws as existing in all human societies and attributes the failure of the analytical jurists to perceive the existence of legal systems among primitive societies to the faulty habit of identifying the legal system with the person or organ possessing the power to make laws and enforce them. He defined law as a body of binding obligations, regarded as a right by one party and acknowledged as a duty by the other, kept in force by a special mechanism of reciprocity and publicity inherent in the structure of their society" (1926:58). Radcliffe-Brown (1933), Lewellyn and Hoebel (1941), Hoebel (1961), Bohannan (1957) and Gluckman (1955, 1965) to give examples, all view law as an aspect of the society independent of any sovereign in the Austinian sense. This does not mean that they all agree in their definition of law. For they exhibit a considerable difference in their views. The difference, however, does not stem from their view of the sociological rather than the formal nature of law, but in their attempt to separate law from other aspects of social life of the group.

The main difficulty with the sociological view of law is that it does not provide a reliable criteria by which one can differentiate between that

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aspect of the social life that one may call law and other aspects. This does not pose any problem for those who use the concept of law in a very wide and general sense to mean "the totality of people's culture" (Hartland 1924:191). But for later writers, who tend to take a more or less restricted view of law, the problem was there. Malinowski states that the rules of law in primitive society stand out from other social norms in that they are felt and regarded as "obligation of one party and the rightful claim of another." This, of course, gives law a very broad definition and does not really help in distinguishing law from non-law.

One of the most commonly used criterion is that of a "sanction" behind the legal norms. But the mere fact that legal norms have sanctions behind them does not help in drawing the line between them and other norms since all norms are backed by sanctions of some kind or another. It is the kind of sanction, then, not just any sanction, that differentiates law from non-law. In other words, there are classes of sanctions that may be called "legal sanctions." For Malinowski, the loss of reciprocal relations in primitive society constituted the sufficient basis for the legal sanctions (1934). Allen (1958) maintained that legal sanctions are "completely compulsory." "No one is under an absolute compulsion to visit the barber or to wear garments" (1958:59), while, on the other hand, members of the society are under an absolute compulsion not to steal or take the life of another person. Like Malinowski's notion of the loss of reciprocal relations, Allen's concept of "absoluteness" as the basis of legal sanctions is not adequate. For even under the modern legal system, were the penalty for stealing or murder specific and clear, the individual is not under an "absolute" compulsion not to steal or kill. He still can, and the mere existence of the penal institution in modern societies is a living proof that many do violate the legal norms if they are willing to take the risk of such violation, the same risk the person takes who violates the norm

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of modesty and walks naked in the streets. Some may even find it easier to accept the risk of penalty for stealing than the social sanctions for violating the norms of modesty.

But although the notion of absolute vs. relative compulsion is arbitrary and artificial as a criterion for defining legal rules, yet Allen is close to another related and widespread criterion of legal sanctions, that is, the idea of the "use of force." Hoebel maintains that "the really fundamental sine qua non of law in any society - primitive or civilized - is the legitimate use of physical coercion.... The law has teeth, teeth that can bite if need be..." (1961a:26) Pound defines law as "social control through the systematic application of the forces of a politically organized society" (1910-11:591). This definition has later been adopted by Radcliffe-Brown (1940) who considers the obligations imposed upon the individual but for which there is no sanction backed by the use or the possibility of use of physical force as merely a matter of social conventions or custom but not law.

It is evident, then, that those who used the concept of "coercion" as the basis for their distinction of law needed a further specification of the concept. For, as Hoebel has noticed, "There are as many forms of coercion as there are forms of power...and only certain methods and forms are legal" (1961:26). He states that coercion by gangsters is not legal coercion; neither is the parents' physical coercion if it is extreme in form. The essential element in legal coercion according to Hoebel, is "the general social acceptance of the application of physical power, threat or, in fact, by a privileged party, for a legitimate cause, in a legitimate way, and at a legitimate time." The privilege of applying physical force constitutes, according to Hoebel, the official element in law. The person who is recognized as having the right to exercise force is the symbol of authority. This does not mean that he has to be an official or a holder

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of any permanent office; it is any person who is exercising the legitimate use of force. Simple as the above argument might seem, it really offers very little in refining our conception of legal sanctions. For we are still left with the question of how a person acquires the right to exercise the physical force. What gives his action the legitimacy that is otherwise lacking in other forms of coercion? In trying to deal with this problem anthropologists resorted to a concept that is used by the analytical jurists, that is, the court. There is a basic difference, however, between the anthropologists' view of the court and that of the analytical jurists. The latter see the court as the ultimate source of law: court creates the law. Anthropologists, on the other hand, tend to use the court as the source of law but as a criterion of its existence. An example of such views is Max Radin who maintained that the infallible test "for recognizing whether an imagined course of conduct is lawful or unlawful... is to submit the question to the judgment of a court" (1938:1145).

Anthropologists differed among themselves, however, on what constitutes a court. While Radcliffe-Brown (1940) insists that it must be a body of people acting on behalf of the community as a whole and therefore does not exist in all societies, Hoebel (1961), on the other hand, extends the concept to include the diffused public opinion or sentiment of the people in a given society as a kind of court that gives legitimation to the use of force by individuals or groups in the absence of a recognized body acting on behalf of the community. He sees a court in cases of self-help where the aggrieved party or his kinsmen carry on the procedures of redress without the intervention of a third party. He maintained that if the procedures are right, there will be "at least the compulsion of recognized 'legal' procedure, though the ultimate court may be the 'bar of public opinion'" (1961:25).

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The concept of the court has been prominent in the writings of several other anthropologists besides Radcliffe-Brown and Hoebel. Bohannan (1957, 1964, 1965), Redfield (1964) and Pospisil (1958) all imply the existence of a court of some kind or another as the identifying mark of the existence of legal rules. In his attempt to distinguish between law and custom, Gluckman thought of law to exist "as a series of acceptable judgments of rightdoing and wrongdoing in particular cases" (1955:262). Custom and other social observances function as corpus juris and as such a basis for the judgment of where the behavior of one of the litigants in a case is reasonable or unreasonable, lawful or unlawful. As such, custom is a source of law, but not law itself. It becomes law when drawn upon in passing judgment in a given case. In commenting on a passage on the Nuer by Evans-Pritchard, Gluckman made it clear what he meant by the court. "This passage shows that even in a society where 'self-help' is the enforcing sanction, people judge situations of dispute in terms of rights and duties, and wrongs....Therefore, it seems fair to say that among the Nuer, though they have no courts, there is a process of judgment by mediators and ordinary people in which custom and morality as part of the corpus juris constitute 'sources of law' for particular decisions" (1955a:263).

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The importance of the above passage from Gluckman is his distinction between the concept of the court and the judicial process, a distinction lacking in the writing of most other anthropologists dealing with the study of law. Failure to distinguish the two aspects of the legal system resulted in confusing a basic societal process with one of the mechanisms through which the goals of that process achieved in certain societies. In its broadest sense, the judicial process refers to the ways disputes are settled within society. Since disputes arise out of the very nature of social interaction, some form of dispute settlement is found in all societies.

The form which the process of dispute settlement takes differs from one society to another. In certain societies disputes are settled through a process of informal mediation undertaken by go-betweens; in others it is by means of self-help; still in others, it is by way of court. In societies with courts the process of dispute settlements is undertaken by judges who "take and assess the evidence, examine what they regard as the facts, and come to a decision in favor of one party rather than another" (Gluckman 1965:183).

Within a given society, disputes are settled in accordance with a set of principles that reflect the basic goals and values of that society. As long as the settlement of a particular dispute proceeds according to these principles, the settlement is supported by the public opinion of that society. This is true whether the process is carried on by means of informal mediations or through a court system. It is this public opinion as the expression of the basic societal values and not the court as a special mechanism that gives legitimation to the judicial decisions. To equate opinion with the court as Hoebel (1961) did, or to look at the court as the ultimate source of legitimation as did Radcliffe-Brown (1940) and others (Redfield 1964, Bohannan 1965), is to create an unnecessary confusion which tends to undermine meaningful cross-cultural comparisons. Whatever the differences among anthropologists with regard to the definition of the court, their main interest in the concept so far has been as a tool for the definition of law. The interest in the concept gave rise to a methodological approach which came to characterize the literature in legal anthropology, namely, the case-study approach, cases having been utilized in a number of ways by legal anthropologists. In their book on the Cheyenne, Llewellyn and Hoebel (1941) introduced the analysis of "the trouble case." This was followed by a number of studies utilizing the case study method either to

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document statements concerning the substantive law of the society studied, or to abstract and elucidate that law. An example of the first technique is Howell's analysis of the Nuer court decisions (1954) where he collected a large number of court cases, classified them and abstracted the substantive aspect of the native law. Gluckman's study of the Lozi (1955) represents the second technique. Smith and Roberts used the same method of case analysis to abstract certain principles of the Zuni law (1954), and Nader utilized it in her study of the Zapotecan law (1964). The list of those who utilized the case-study approach is quite extensive, and the range of the societies they studied is quite varied. But most of them share the interest in the substantive rather than in the procedural aspect of the law.

When referring to the procedural aspect of the law one should keep in mind the difference between the technical and the abstract components of procedural law. The first refers to the activities and steps involved in the settlement of disputes in the society as well as the person or body undertaking the responsibility of such settlement. The second involves a number of abstract principles reflecting the values of the society with regard to the goals of the judicial process, and which the judicial persons use as a guide in achieving a settlement or in passing a judgment of one kind or another. These are the bases of judicial reasoning. Although judicial reasoning represents one of the most interesting and important aspects of the judicial process, it attracted very little attention among legal anthropologists. With the exception of Gluckman and his analysis of the concept of "reasonable man" among the Lozi (1955a), no significant work has been done in this area. In dealing with the concept of the reasonable man, Gluckman was more interested in discovering universals in laws than in the process of judicial reasoning as such. He implied that an

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element of reasonableness is a universal principle in any judicial logic. Nadel reacts to Gluckman's implication of the universality of the concept suggesting that it is valid only in certain contexts, and that the cases reported by Gluckman from which he abstracted that concept are minor ones. Nadel maintained that the principle seems inadequate in major crimes such as homicide, witchcraft or assault. "If I am right, the Lozi would, in these situations, discard their guiding fiction of 'reasonable man' for the sharper dichotomy of things simply lawful and unlawful, permitted and forbidden" (1956:162).

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METHODOLOGY

One of the characteristics of legal anthropology is the absence of a coherent body of theory that could be utilized in the analysis and interpretation of the ethnographic data. What do exist, however, in the area of the ethnography of law are a variety of what may be called "tools of analysis." These are mainly methods and orientations which help to direct the researcher's attention to a certain area of behavior which describes best the phenomenon under study. Their main purpose is to help the researcher isolate particular portions of the phenomenon he is studying and as such enables him to conceptualize the problem. A number of these tools have been employed in the present study. One of these tools is Turner's "social drama" which was employed in the analysis of the political leadership and the judicial process. Since this approach depends upon the intimate knowledge of the sequential development of a given case, or cases, over a period of time, it was quite difficult to employ it in more than that particular context. As will be apparent in the later chapters, the judicial process among the group is highly informal. Most of the disputes are settled by means of mediation which is done behind the scene and with a great deal of secrecy.

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I managed, however, during my stay to be closely in touch with one 12
of the major cases and with almost all the parties involved. This case
was used as the basis for the "social drama" analyzed in chapter three
of the present study.

In addition to the social drama, I have used the case study method 121
to analyze aspects of the substantive law of the group especially with 127
regard to concepts such as that of criminal responsibility and the nature
of the contractual relations as exemplified by the marriage contract.
Cases utilized in the study include ones that I observed myself as well [24]
as cases taken from texts and some which were told to me by informants.

Most of the data was collected through the time-honored technique 123
of participant observation which was facilitated by the fact that the 122
group spoke the native language of the researcher (or vice versa). Formal 124
interviewing was conducted on a very limited scale, thirty-five extensive 125
questionnaires in all. These questionnaires were originally designed and
administered to supplement the life history material and to assess the
attitudes of the particular people involved with regard to particular
issues. Some of the results of these questionnaires are used in the
chapter. Due to the non-representation of the sample interviewed, these
results are used merely as illustration and not as representing any kind
of statistical frequency.

ENTRY TO THE FIELD

It is common among anthropologists to talk with nostalgia about their 114
field experience and about the group they studied. This usually gives the
impression that field work is always an enjoyable experience. Although my
field work seems at the present time to have been a pleasant experience,
especially when comparing it to the pressures of everyday living in a

CHAPTER III

TRIBAL ORGANIZATION

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619 In discussing the tribal organization of Awlad Ali two modes of analysis are employed. One is a structural form of analysis in which emphasis is on the hierarchy of groups and subgroups by which the tribesmen order themselves. This view of the system is an outside one regarding all smaller units as parts of a delimited whole: Awlad Ali. The other mode of analysis involves the description of some of these groups in terms of the processes by which they emerge and maintain themselves.

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563 The first problem one encounters in pursuing the first kind of analysis is that of definition of the tribal boundaries. It has been mentioned earlier that the name Awlad Ali includes a number of groups of different ethnic backgrounds. Some of these have been incorporated into the tribe by the system of tribal adoption known as "Iktitab." Such groups consider themselves as Awlad Ali and are considered as such by Awlad Ali proper as well as by outsiders. Other groups such as the Murabiteen are not thus incorporated into the tribe; and although 121
619 they consider themselves to be Awlad Ali, they are not viewed as such by Awlad Ali themselves who prefer to keep the position of the Murabiteen distinct as an inferior group. On the other hand, many [167] Awlad Ali have moved outside the area of the Western Desert and have become settled cultivators on the banks of the Nile. These retain a vague and remote genetic connection to the name Awlad Ali.

To avoid this problem, it is best to define the tribe by political rather than by ethnic criterion. There is no paramount chief of the

There is no paramount chief of the


tribe at the present time; yet, the unifying force is the recognition by the group of the tribal law, the Daraieb, as a binding set of rules and as the regulator of behavior within the area. In these terms,

Awlad Ali are a clearly delimited group, and it is in terms of the jurisdiction of these rules that Awlad Ali are treated as a unit for administrative purposes by the Egyptian government. Viewed this way, Awlad Ali will be defined as those who recognize and abide by

the Daraieb or the customary law. This includes the Murabiteen tribes

as well as all those who became part of the tribal organization of Awlad Ali by means of Iktitab. Since the territorial jurisdiction of the Daraieb is limited to the Western Desert of Egypt, those groups and individuals of Awlad Ali origin who have moved on a permanent basis from the area will be excluded from the group. Groups and individuals who live in the area but are not part of the tribal organization of Awlad Ali are not subject to the Daraieb.

Awlad Ali of the Western Desert of Egypt are an offshoot of the Cyrenaica tribes who in turn believe themselves to be the descendants of a unique ancestress Sa'ada.



628 the settlement achieved. In many such interest is best served by taking
613 into consideration the welfare of the other party to the dispute as well.

613 Reasonableness is an important prerequisite for the success of the
554 Aqila in performing this functions in dispute settlement. This is true
157 whether the Aqila is dealing with disputes between members of his own
bait or between members of his bait and outsiders. But while reasonable-
ness and the personal qualities constitute important assets for the Aqila,

613 they are not the basis of his political authority. Proven abilities are
554 admired but they are, or had been until very recently, irrelevant to the
178 question of succession to the position of Aqila. The structurally signi-
ficant source of the Aqila's authority is patrilineal succession. This
principle has recently been challenged under the impact of social and
economic changes that are taking place in the area. To analyze the role

121 of the Aqila and the source of his authority, I shall utilize, to some
613 extent, Turner's concept of "social drama" by presenting and analyzing a
128 case of dispute whose developmental stages happened over a period of more
than eleven years. The major part of these developments occurred at the
time of the field work and I had a chance to observe at least part of it.
The case in all its phases offers a rare example of a disturbance that
happened in the social life of a particular tribal segment. It offers
what Turner called "... a limited area of transparency in the otherwise
opaque surface of regular, uneventful social life" (p. 93). The politi-
cal unit involved is that of bait Asabe'i, the largest in size of all
baits in the Aggary Eila. As events of the case unfolded themselves,
some of the important principles of social structure, at least as they
operate at a given point, were revealed.

28 ORIGIN AND EXPANSION OF THE SANUSIYA

*795 Bilma and in the following year occupied 'Ain Kalak, killing
*175 Sidi Muhammad al-Barrani, the Shaikh of the Sanusiya lodge
*648 there and the foremost of al-Sayyid al-Mahdi's missionaries in
the Sahara. In 1909 they occupied Abaish in Wadai and sent
an expedition against Masalit. As they advanced they every-
where destroyed or suppressed the lodges of the Order. In
1913 and 1914 they occupied Tibesti, Borku, Wajanqa, and
Ennedi, at the same time as the Italians occupied Fazzan from
Tripolitania. Though the Sanusiya had minor military suc-
cesses and temporarily regained some of its territory, it had lost
all political control in what is now known as the French Sudan.
While the Franco-Sanusi war was in progress in the Sudan
Italy, in 1911, declared war on Turkey and landed troops at
various points on the Libyan coast, the conquest of Tripolitania
being the primary objective. From the first the Sanusiya
entered the fray and when Turkey abandoned the contest in
1912 the Order continued the struggle in its own name.

128 At this point I must break off my account of the history of the
*795 Order to show how it achieved its paramountcy in Cyrenaica,
121 because the development of the Order is tied up with a certain
set of social relations in Cyrenaica and has been circumscribed
by them. Only in Cyrenaica did the Sanusiya in the end
establish itself firmly because only there existed conditions
which permitted its taking root strongly.

*795 Sudanese against the French in 1902 and, as we will see, it was
554 they who roused the Bedouin of Cyrenaica and of large parts of
*648 Tripolitania and Fazzan against the Italians in 1911; and it was
they who attempted, unsuccessfully, to rouse the Bedouin of
Egypt against the British in 1915. It was, above all, their
propaganda and personal example in the field which made the
struggle against Italy a national war and a religious crusade.
[198] To-day they have been broken by death, exile, and expropria-
tion, and are poor and ignorant, but in the heyday of their
power the Turks rightly estimated their influence and were care-
ful not to encroach on their prerogatives.

VI

*795 The thesis I have maintained in the foregoing pages, that the
• 121 Sanusiya kept its cohesion and developed into a political
182 organization largely because it was identified with the tribal
system of the Bedouin, is supported by the lack of cohesion,
common direction, and political influence of the other Islamic
Orders in Libya, which won adherents only in the towns of
Cyrenaica and among the citizens and peasants of Tripolitania,
and in neither country found support among the Bedouin. I
mention these other Orders for this reason, and also because a
reference to them, however brief, places the Sanusiya in a more
general setting as only one among many Darwish Orders. These
other Orders are, however, described barely, since the part they
have played in the political history of Cyrenaica is negligible.

*795 The following Orders besides the Sanusiya are represented in
Cyrenaica: Qadiriya, Rifa'iya, 'Arusiya, 'Isawiya, Tayyibiya,
'Azuziya, Madaniya, and Sa'adiya. The Qadiriya and the
Rifa'iya are the only two classical Orders with lodges in the
country, though the others eventually trace their descent from
classical sources by those tortuous ramifications so confusing
to the student of Islamic fraternities.

The distribution of the lodges of these Orders in Cyrenaica
at the present time is shown in the table opposite. A knowledge
of the history of the Orders is not necessary for an under-
standing of the history of the Sanusiya in Cyrenaica and is
therefore omitted. It is necessary only to know that they all
entered Cyrenaica from the west, both those, the majority,

TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 86 1

(P.104)

CHAPTER V

THE FIRST ITALO-SANUSI WAR (1911-17)

I

128 I HAVE given an account of the conditions in which the Sanusiya
*795 took root in Cyrenaica and of the circumstances which favoured
*648 its growth. I now describe how its Bedouin followers, under
*175 its leadership, resisted Italian aggression during two wars, from
1911 to 1917 and from 1923 to 1932, and finally lost their
independence and suffered Italian domination until relieved by
British arms in 1942. It will be seen how the long struggle
accentuated the political functions of the Sanusiya in a manner
I indicate forthwith.

• 121 For segmentary structures of the kind we find among the
182 Bedouin of Cyrenaica to develop rudimentary governmental,
*648 or statal, organs it would seem necessary that for a long period
of time all the segments of the society should find themselves
in common opposition to some outside force. It is not merely
that such opposition fuses the segments in corporate action. A
new form of political structure which includes the enemy comes
into existence and necessitates a new orientation of political
values. In a segmentary system each segment sees itself as a
unity in opposition to an opposed segment of the same size and
kind; so when all the segments come into a corporate relation of
opposition to some political group outside them which has a
different kind of political structure and belongs to a different
political system they tend to see themselves as a unity *vis-à-vis*
this group and as a unity on the same structural model as itself.

(177) The small Bedouin society of Cyrenaica in this way slowly took
on the political form of the European countries into the orbit
of which it was drawn. It could only enter into structural rela-
tions with the states of Europe on the model of the European
state.

*175 When the Italians invaded the country and the Turks made
*648 peace the tribes continued their resistance in the name of the
*795 Sanusiya. In their social system tribe was balanced against
619 tribe and tribal section against tribal section. It was the
Sanusiya which gave to all the tribes and their sections a com-

[P.363]

EMRYS PETERS

18. *The Proliferation of Segments in the Lineage of the Bedouin of Cyrenaica [Libya]*¹

121 In this article I do not propose to discuss the genealogies of the
128 Cyrenaican Bedouin in full, but only such aspects of them as are strictly relevant to an understanding of their process of growth. Many other aspects of these genealogies will be referred to, and indeed, some of the arguments put forward will presume an acceptance of views which cannot be developed adequately in this article. A fuller and more general account of Cyrenaican genealogies is in preparation, and, until this is published, there is no alternative to the somewhat dogmatic statements about them which appear in the introductory part of this article.

174 The Bedouin of Cyrenaica claim that they are all descendants
613 of a unique ancestress, Sa'ada. Writers in the past (e.g.
551 Robertson-Smith 1903) have considered the occurrence of fe-
562 male names in patrilineal genealogies as evidence of an earlier
[193] and matrilineal mode of descent. A more satisfactory explanation of the occurrence of female names is to be found in the combination of two facts: descent in the patriline, whether or

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122 ¹ My field work among the Cyrenaican Bedouin was made possible by an award from the Emslie Horniman Fund and a later award from the Treasury Committee for Studentships in Oriental Languages and Cultures. I wish here to express my indebtedness to both committees for their generosity. Much of the work I have done on genealogies was included in a thesis presented for the degree of D.Phil. at Oxford University in 1951. The ideas included in this thesis I developed more systematically in a course of lectures on the Bedouin which I gave at Manchester University during the session 1953-54. I subsequently read papers around the problems discussed in this paper at Oxford and Cambridge Universities. I am grateful to Professor Gluckman for reading this article in manuscript, and for the numerous discussions I have had with him on problems relating to lineage organization.

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Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East

193 Although I must confess that I now
 178 find it difficult to accept Evans-Pritchard's view of genealogical
 613 growth and development as stated for the Nu'ar, it was the view
 551 I originally held with regard to Bedouin genealogies. Indeed,
 114 thinking in genealogical terms only, it appears inevitable that the
 addition of successive generations can only mean the lengthening
 of the genealogy, or, if the length is to remain constant, extrusion
 of ancestral names must take place at the apex of the genealogy.
 If this view is to be accepted, several other conclusions must be
 accepted with it. The genealogy, as far as it goes at least, is an
 accurate record of descent—some names may have been lopped
 off at the top, but otherwise the genealogy represents a faithful
 statement of succession. Again, if successive generations are to be
 added to the genealogy, then its base must continually expand
 laterally. From what is known of contemporary Bedouin geneal-
 ogies, there is no evidence which leads to the supposition that
 their base is progressively widening. With regard to the authen-
 ticity of the names in the genealogy, above the point of tertiary
 segmentation, I hope to show in a subsequent article on Bedouin
 genealogies in general, that names above the tertiary point of
 segmentation have remained fixed for very long periods of time,
 and that they bear slight relation to the passage of generations
 over the last century at least; moreover, in this article I hope to
 demonstrate that what manipulation of the genealogy takes place
 does not affect more than about four or five ascending genera-
 tions from the living.

• 121 Part of the difficulty in a study of this sort lies in the strong
 173 temptation to think of the genealogy *per se*, even though it is
 613 readily admitted that it has a value in itself for the Bedouin. Yet
 even in these terms the genealogy must always represent an ordered
 grouping of people, and these people live on strips of territory.
 The starting point of the analysis then ought to begin with the
 territorial ordering of groups of people. The relation of groups
 of people to land, moreover, is determined by the carrying capacity
 of that land, and it is this prerequisite which is the main variable
 in discussing genealogical manipulation, and not the other way about.
 (182) The main landmarks of the Cyrenaican ecology are fixed points
 which cannot be manipulated to fit in with the genealogy; it is the
 genealogy which must be altered to comprehend the distribution of
 people in their ecological setting.

The Proliferation of Segments

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121 If, moreover, the view of a genealogy as a continually expanding
 173 line of descent is to be accepted, it must be accepted also that
 613 large structural units, even in conditions of population stability,
 619 are to experience a continuous re-ordering of their structural re-
 1178 lationships. In practice, what this means is that a tribe of, say
 20,000 souls cease to be tribesmen of a named tribe and instead
 all become members of an almost identical group but with a
 different name. To take an example from the genealogy given
 [162] on page 365: the Magharba tribe shown there has a total popu-
 lation of some 13,000 souls. If proliferation affected the topmost
 limits of this tribe, the apical name disappears and presumably
 the name of one of the primary sections is to be substituted. That
 is, half the tribe would have to take on the lineage name of their
 opposed primary section. The only alternative to the use of the
 name of a primary segment as a substitute for the abandoned
 tribal name is the acceptance by 13,000 people of a totally new
 name, which is most unlikely.

It is reasonable to assume therefore, that the genealogy, in its
 general form, is fixed for long periods of time at least. This still
 leaves the problem of how and where adjustments are made to
 face the contingencies of birth and death, of the succession of
 generations, and of the irregular increases and decreases of popu-
 lation among the tertiary segments. An important clue lies in the
 number of segments which appear at the various orders of seg-
 mentation. From Sa'ada, the founding ancestress, in the line
 which runs to Nasr, each ancestor is shown as having a pair of
 sons for four orders of segmentation. At the fifth generation from
 Sa'ada—this is now the secondary order of segmentation within
 the tribe—the number of sons increases to four. Not all tribes will
 show the same number of sons at each generation as the
 Magharba—some, for example, might show three instead of two
 at the primary order—but what is true of all tribes is that there is
 evident consistency in the number down to and including the
 fifth generation from Sa'ada; if, that is to say, one of a tribe's pri-
 mary segments is divided into three secondary sections, the other
 one or two, as the case may be, will be divided likewise. Through-
 out the tribes in Cyrenaica, then, segmentation of orders superior
 to the tertiary segments shows a pronounced consistency in their
 numbers.

794 were concerned, there was little doubt who was leader—the
554 name of the former was known throughout the land. Now when
794 the warrior returned from his Egyptian exile, his rival offered
554 him a sheep as a gift. This act was wholly appropriate. Subse-
578 quently they continued to compete fiercely, but it soon became
clear that the returned warrior was winning the greater support.

[788] In the face of this, the rival, in 1948, decided to break with tradi-
[175] tion by staying away from the annual pilgrimage to the tomb of
the local saint. Instead, he and his followers made their pilgrim-
age to a different tomb in the vicinity of their camp, and later
built a low wall round the tomb, whitewashed it, and made it
known that henceforward they would regularly use it for pilgrim-
ages. The two kinship groups of a tertiary section now had their
separate saint's tomb. Some months later, the rival decided to
move with his small group to an area in which they had not pre-
viously resided. It is the custom among the Bedouin when they
pitch their tents in a place for the first time, that the people of
the neighbourhood should bring them gifts to mark the event.

[613] The returned warrior, who had now become a close neighbour
[798] of his rival was obliged, like others, to offer the latter a gift; he
794 was also obliged to return the gift of a sheep that he had been
554 given on rejoining his section in 1947. He brought a gift within a
578 few hours of his rival's arrival, but it was a goat.¹⁴ The rival and
431 his followers were furious, and the argument that the warrior was
[166] too poor to give more was dismissed summarily. This was the
final insult. The donor, in return, had been given less than he had
presented. The reciprocity of gift exchanges had not only been
arrested, it had been reversed. From then onwards the two groups
made no attempt to conceal their hostility and went their sepa-
rate ways.

613 Disputes stemming from circumstances such as these are the
578 occasions which mark the proliferation of groups, although in
all three cases cited, difficulties over water supplies had pre-
ceded the outbreaks of quarrelling.

613 In this discussion of the ways in which proliferation of seg-
602 ments takes place, the emphasis had been put on the tug of war
121 between the interests of people in their agnatic connexions and

¹⁴ A goat is inferior to a sheep in gift exchanges.

The Proliferation of Segments

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the interests they have in their maternal relatives. Stated thus sharply, this is a distortion of the process. To speak of the principle of agnation conflicting with the principle of cognation or maternal origin is nonsense, as the facts included in the discussion show. Agnation is not one thing, but many. Within its scope are included such aspects of social organization as succession, status, inheritance, bride-wealth, blood-money, modes of domestic and political behaviour, and so forth; and each of these aspects, the closer we stick to reality, can be broken up into a number of components. The same can be said of cognation and maternal origin. All these principles, so called, are clusters of numerous component parts, which combine, in reality, in a kaleidoscopic number of ways. In one situation a component of one combines with that of another to strengthen it; in a different situation the one component may repel the other; in a third situation, a number of the components in one will combine to exclude those of the other, and so on. If, therefore, an understanding of the way in which lineage proliferation occurs is sought, a view of the process as a conflict between the principle of agnation and the opposing pull of maternal origin is quite erroneous. It is of use in predicting the direction of cleavage to know that within a tertiary group there are also clusters of kin which are defined roughly by maternal links, and this knowledge serves as a rough and ready guide in predicting what the composition of groups, after they have split away from the parent group, will be. If a more precise picture of this composition is desired, other and more complex kinship links and the behaviour which accompanies them must be taken into account. If a still more accurate picture is desired, details of inheritance disputes, debts of bride-wealth, the size of flocks and herds, and the like, must also be taken into consideration. If, finally, one has the opportunity to study groups after they have proliferated, the presence or absence of this or that man can often be explained only in terms of his eye for a pretty girl or a personal preference for neighbours.

The kind of change which has been discussed in this essay is not difficult to negotiate in genealogical terms. Earlier it was stressed that within the tertiary tribal sections, although they are always predominantly agnatic groups, clusters of cognatic

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kin also exist. Two ways of naming these clusters are adopted—all groups, whether they are elementary families, an odd assortment of kindred sharing a common tent for reasons of expediency, or tribal groups, have a name. Sometimes these clusters are named after a prominent living male, or a deceased kinsman of the same kind. Sometimes these little groups are named after a woman, perhaps the grandmother of the group.¹⁵ Thus a small group of two or three tents will be distinguished from another similar cluster within the camp, and so on for a number of groups, depending on the size of the camp. Most camps, however many tents they contain, have names for progressively inclusive clusters of tents until a twofold named division is reached. Tertiary segments that are forced to split contain therefore two groups with names already attached to them. When a split occurs, the name of the tertiary segment is pushed into the area of ambiguity and the names of what were previously two clusters become the names of two new tertiary segments, with a minimum adjustment in usage and a minor re-shuffle at the tertiary level of segmentation. Names cannot continue to be pushed into this area of the genealogy interminably, otherwise it would gradually expand into a vast pool of names. For a few generations the name dispensed with in this way becomes one of those ancestors about whom there is argument when genealogies are given. In the course of time, name after name is subjected to the process of elision and eventually will cease to be of concern to anyone.

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I now summarize the main points of the discussion. The evidence that has been examined suggests that the mechanical devices of telescoping, fusion of names, and extinction of lines do not affect orders of segmentation superior to that of the tertiary order, and that in conditions of a completely stable population, these devices alone would suffice to retain the form of the genealogical structure. But, it was argued, conditions of complete stability cannot be assumed; the evidence of the present distribution of population among the numerous tertiary groups clearly points to marked fluctuations occurring within these small groups. This being so, proliferation of these groups in some areas at some

¹⁵ The naming of groups within a tertiary segment is an interesting study in itself, but it would be outside the limits of this discussion to make more than a brief mention of it.

105 Change due to the normal and inevitable process of proliferation
613 is thus managed within the structural limits of the tertiary section
173 without disturbing any of the superior orders in the system. The
178 latter remain fixed over long periods, but the tertiary sections of
a particular secondary action may be reduced in number over a
few generations while another secondary section may show a cor-
responding increase in the number of its segments.

121 By combining the various factors involved in change, it is pos-
178 sible to understand the details of lineage proliferation, or at least
613 to travel along a well signposted road. In the light of this analy-
161 sis, moreover, it is unnecessary to assume a stable population in
each and every segment over long periods; the mechanisms of
readjustment allow for substantial irregularities and fluctuations
in population. It is possible that they are also sufficient to con-
tain significant increases in the aggregate population. They could
almost certainly control minor fluctuations, but it is seriously
doubted whether a population increase sufficient to produce a
country-wide and acute water shortage could be met merely by
the proliferation of tertiary lineage segments. But to deal with
this problem other aspects of the Bedouin genealogy and details
of Cyrenaican history, which have necessarily been omitted from
this discussion, would have to be taken into account, and this is
best left for another article.

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SOME STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF THE FEUD AMONG
THE CAMEL-HERDING BEDOUIN OF CYRENAICA¹

E. L. PETERS

WHEN a Bedouin kills another in Cyrenaica, one of a number of consequences ensues. According to the Bedouin, the particular consequence is determined by the genealogical positions of the persons or groups concerned. In the first part of this article an analysis of the disturbances in social relationships precipitated by homicide is made, using a lineage model as a framework. In this part of the discussion the arrangement of the information corresponds closely to the view the Bedouin give of their relationships. Additional information is then presented to show that this lineage model neither covers several important areas of social relationships nor enables an accurate prediction of events to be made. This raises the issue: can the comprehensive power of the model be increased by complicating it, or does complexity destroy its utility? The argument advanced is that the lineage model is not a sociological one, but that it is a frame of reference used by a particular people to give them a common-sense kind of understanding of their social relationships. For sociological purposes this means that the lineage model, with its supporting theoretical presuppositions, must perforce be abandoned. In the latter part of this article some of the implications of adopting this position are discussed. Particular stress is

¹ This study is based on field-work in Cyrenaica carried out over a period of twenty-seven months from January 1948 to December 1950. The field-work was made possible by the award of a Horniman Studentship and of a Treasury Senior Studentship in Oriental Languages and Cultures. I wish to express my thanks to both awarding bodies. The paper was presented in its first form to a seminar at Manchester University. Modified versions were read at Oxford and Cambridge and at University College London in 1963. In a Manchester seminar, Professor W. J. M. Mackenzie raised issues which led me to reconsider my mode of analysis. Professor Ely Devons read a draft of the article, and offered valuable suggestions.

I also wish to thank Professor Gluckman for the many profitable discussions we have had on the institution of the feud. My interest in the feud stems directly from Evans-Pritchard's work on the institution among the Nuer. I am most grateful to him for his help and encouragement while I was pursuing my researches. Finally, anyone writing on the feud must acknowledge the contribution made to its understanding by Dr. Elizabeth Colson.

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121 given to the feud, for this is one of the few societies in which it occurs.¹ What is
 613 meant here by a state of feud is a set of relationships between two tribal groups which
 578 are characterized by hostility whenever two or more of their members meet. These
 591 hostilities are of a sort which cannot be terminated; feud is not a matter of a group
 121 indulging in hostilities here at one moment and there the next, but a sequence of
 613 hostilities which, as far as the contemporary Bedouin are concerned at least, know
 578 no beginning and are insoluble. Feud and the other forms of relationships to be
 591 discussed presently are to be understood, in part, by reference to the ordered divisions
 of the tribes. It is necessary at the outset, therefore, to give a brief statement about
 the tribal organization; other details will be included as they become relevant.

619 There are nine noble tribes in Cyrenaica whose members are referred to as freemen.
 621 These tribes see themselves as divided into three genealogical orders of sections:
 613 primary, secondary, and tertiary. The tertiary tribal sections correspond to the camps
 591 which cluster around the larger watering points during the drought season, May to
 132 November. Such camps consist of clusters of smaller camps in which the concentra-
 tion of agnatically related males is over 80 per cent. Within the latter kinship links
 are known, so that these agnates are consanguinely related as well as politically
 162 united. The populations of most tertiary groups vary from about 200 to 700 or so,
 but a group ceases to be viable if the number of male adults drops much below fifty.
 Political division is absent from these tertiary groups, regardless of their precise
 size, for, whatever may be the condition of developing local lineages, the acceptance
 of a common name carries with it full political responsibility incumbent equally on
 423 all their members. Each of these tertiary sections, moreover, has its own watering
 point, ploughland, and pastures; each has its own *watan* or homeland. This statement
 is true of all tribal sections of whatever order of segmentation. In other words, the
 tribes and their sections correspond to an ordered division of the territory.

619 Names of tribal sections are the same as those given in the genealogies. Both tribe
 613 and lineage are identically ordered. Lineages develop, and split at the tertiary order
 of segmentation,² and, *a fortiori*, the process is the same for the tertiary tribal sections.
 Split, in other words, occurs where relationships are most intense.

621 The summer community which constitutes a tertiary section, breaks up once the
 221 rains begin in November or December. At this time of the year water is readily
 available in the numerous small cisterns, there is pasture in plenty, and the animals
 are giving milk. These combined reasons lead the larger summer camp to divide
 into smaller camps of some five to ten tents. The latter are separated one from the
 other by short distances—a mile or so—but together form a cluster in that they are
 621 territorially distinguishable from a neighbouring and similar group of camps. Ter-
 311 tiary sections are discrete also in the sense that all the major necessities of daily living
 are available within their several territories. Each controls its own natural resources,
 and these resources are the same for all the camel-herding groups—in any given year
 one may have more of a particular commodity than another, but the difference is in

171 ¹ Evans-Pritchard, 1940. The feud might have been present among the Nuer. Exogamy and the other rules of marriage which obtain among them create a dispersion of ties, which superficially appears to militate against a condition of feud. But a dispersal of ties does not mean that they necessarily act as a

pressure for peace. Moreover, the exogamous links may link limited numbers of groups only, leaving others with sufficient discreteness to pursue feuding relationships as they are described in this paper.

² See Peters, 1959.

682 To complete this general statement, two further circumstances are cited by the
602 Bedouin. If a man kills a related person who is not an agnate (it is expressed as killing
the mother's brother) the breach in relationships must be healed as quickly as possible.
The convention for dealing with this is that the offender, bound hand and foot,
mounted on a horse, is sent to the camp of 'the owner of the blood', in the company
of a holy man, there to make an offer of his life, saying: 'Here is my knife, my life
is yours; here is my shroud, my life is yours.' No Bedouin would agree for a moment
to undertake this journey if he thought the offer might be accepted. In Bedouin
sentiments a life offered in this way cannot be taken. It is the convention which pre-
cedes a peace meeting and blood money. Any other way of dealing with the confusion,
which spreads as a result of a homicide between cognates, is excluded.

682 Secondly, if a woman is killed, whatever the intersegmentary distance, the homi-
562 cide is said to be accidental, because a man never 'intends' to kill a woman. Blood-
613 money arrangements are made as soon as possible, and the wealth—half that of a
man—passes to the deceased's father, not to her husband, for a woman's 'bone'
always belongs to her father. Obviously women cannot be allowed to enter into
[582] feud; since it is demographically compelling (apart from other reasons) for some of
[591] them to marry outside their natal groups, then they might well find themselves resi-
dents in the enemy's camps, if they were to become involved in feuds.

• 121 This statement of the different means available for the regulation of homicide at
682 the several orders of tribal segmentation is the view the Bedouin themselves hold of
613 their relationships. An analysis of the facts presented thus far could bring out a
829 number of interesting points with regard to the relativity of morals, the typification
619 of acts by their social context, the significance of the orders of segmentation, and so
on. Rather than proceed along these lines, however, it is more urgently necessary
to reflect on the significance of the fact that the arrangement of the material in terms
of what is usually called the lineage structure coincides with the Bedouin ordering
of the same details. It is, of course, important to note that the account is not based
on mere hearsay evidence. Each statement made can be documented from known
homicides, and to this extent the model that has been used is consistent with reality.
The model, nevertheless, can only be a representation of what a particular people,
the Bedouin, conceive their social reality to be; it is a kind of ideology which enables
them, without making absurd demands on their credulity, to understand their field
of social relationships, and to give particular relationships their *raison d'être*. But, as
will be shown, it would be a serious error to mistake such a folk model for sociological
analysis. Such an error is difficult to avoid because the Bedouin, when defending their
view, are able to cite enough bits and pieces of reality to make their argument con-
vincing. The flaw in the reasoning is seen when it can be shown that its consequences
are absurd. As an example of what is meant, the statement that feud is attached to
121 groups at the secondary order of segmentation may be considered. If the statement
114 were true, if each and every secondary section were at feud one with the other (and
613 in a structural sense this ought to be so), then each tribe would be divided into small
619 mutually hostile groups, which completely lacked any possibility of movement, even
829 for pasturing purposes. Presented with this, the Bedouin would argue that this is not
578 in fact so, because secondary and primary sections are interlinked in many ways. That
is, they evoke what to them are contingencies to explain why they are at feud with one

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part of a secondary section but not with another. Once contingencies are permitted to enter in, the lineage model ceases to be of use, for what is implied is that at all times some parts of sections structurally situated for feuding do not in fact feud. Other facts can be adduced to show that the structural view is inadequate but, before proceeding to examine these, some general objections to the lineage theory need to be raised. In the first instance, the corner stone in the theory of lineage systems is that they consist of parts which are in balanced opposition. It is no accident that the idiom generally used in discussing the segmentation of a lineage system is that segments bifurcate. Indeed bifurcation is necessary if lineage theory is to make sense, because if at any order there are more than two segments, then combinations can occur which are not comprehended by the theory. In the Cyrenaican lineage the number of segments at the tertiary order is haphazard, in some cases as few as two but in others as many as a dozen or so. Where there are many segments at this order it is rather pointless to speak in terms of balanced opposition. Moreover, at the secondary order of segmentation the number of segments are fairly consistent throughout the tribes, but they number more than two in all of them. It is also a fact that combinations occur and, moreover, these may be between the tertiary segments of two 'opposed' secondary segments.

Secondly, in lineage theory groups come together to constitute larger segments in opposition to like segments. Yet in lineage societies there is a lack of instituted authority, there are no chiefs distributed throughout the land as heads of segments of the hierarchical orders. This being so, then it is not possible for all the sections of, say, a secondary section to come together; there is no one to command the action. In fact, sections combine in Cyrenaica, but not in the way they should according to the lineage structure. In order to discuss this adequately, a lengthy diversion into an analysis of the distribution of power would be necessary. The matter must rest here with the admittedly-somewhat dogmatic assertion that there are men who wield power over groups of varying populations, and that the extent of their domains cannot be understood by reference to orders in the lineage. Perhaps it is for this reason—because, that is to say, lineage theory effectively blocks the exercise—that relatively little has been written about the problem of leadership in these societies.

Thirdly, all segments should be fairly equal in numbers of people and economic resources, if the theory of lineage were to have substance in reality. In Cyrenaica the population of one tertiary segment may be three times or more that of another. Both may be structurally equal in the sense that they are named groups segmenting as a pair of brothers from a common father. As political groups, however, this equality has little meaning. Further, with regard to economic resources, some sections possess several wells and a territory of such extent that it straddles two or even more of what might be called micro-ecological areas. With marked preponderance in numbers and superiority of resources, some groups have grown into dominance, and the evidence points to the existence of this dominance in the past also. However, 'like' sections may appear on a lineage chart, in political action there is conspicuous disparity. Each tribe possesses one tertiary section or more with a claim to be the owners of the 'Golden Stirrup'; these are large tertiary groups with relatively plentiful resources, with allies in other groups, and, in sum, with the power to terrorize other tribal groups.

- 121 These three objections to the lineage theory as a useful model for examining the
 613 consequences of homicide are serious enough in themselves, but another objection
 562 renders it still less satisfactory. This fourth objection relates to the implication that
 114 lineage theory cannot take account of women. Indeed, in some of the accounts of the
 political organization of lineage societies, the impression is given that they are all-
 male societies: women belong only to the domestic and kinship realms. In terms of
 the theory, this must be so. Women, the marriage links they create, the forms of
 relationships that derive from marriage, the right of men to joke with others by
 virtue of a link through women, their rights to demand favours of men who are not
 their agnates, their right to expect contributions to bridewealth or blood money
 from maternal relatives—all these, and other forms of behaviour, have been dealt
 with as patterns of behaviour which interfere with or disturb agnation, or that cut
 across lineage affiliations. Such metaphors can only be justified if it is accepted that
 121 precedence must be given to agnation, to what people say they think their lineage
 613 relationships to be, and that there is some kind of primacy about what have frequently
 been called jural rules which constitute the structure, while behaviour which is not
 governed by these rules is to be relegated to the position of secondary forms having
 the effect of intruding only. But these secondary forms of behaviour are as impelling,
 as persisting, and are as much a part of social life as any of the so-called jural rules.
 [582] It is possible to go further than this, and state that in societies where there is a high
 incidence of marriage among agnates of the local group, as occurs among the Bedouin,
 jural rules rarely appear in their 'pure' form in behaviour, since, in groups of this
 sort, each and every person constitutes a bundle of roles by virtue of the fact that he
 is one of a very complex cognatic group; a particular role, it is true, may take pre-
 cedence in a particular situation, but all roles are present in each situation and affect
 behaviour. Precedence can only be given to specific forms of behaviour in relation
 to situations. There is no such thing as a general primacy with regard to any form.
 The concept of agnation as the centre of all political problems, disturbed or disrupted
 by, say, matrilinearity, is as inadequate as saying that the nucleus which pulls all other
 components into position is matrilinearity with agnation as a disturbing element. In
 reality there are numerous components present in all situations, which should not
 be lumped together under such categorizing terms as agnation and matrilinearity,
 but which combine as separate components in a kaleidoscopic range of clusters.
 121 Some of the components of behaviour subsumed under the notion of matrilinearity
 613 are briefly given here in order to appreciate more fully the consequence of inter-group
 marriage. Of paramount importance is the fact that, in Bedouin sentiment, to kill
 682 a relative is as sinful an act as the killing of a close agnate. When such a homicide
 674 did occur, during my period of residence among them, the Bedouin response was to
 829 assert that the offender was out of his mind—it was inconceivable that he could have
 [602] committed the offence otherwise. Their attitude was reminiscent of the horror they
 display when a man kills his father or a full brother, and represents a much stronger
 reaction than is manifested when a man kills an agnate of, say, the third or fourth
 degree. They have every reason to be disturbed by the killing of a mother's brother,
 [604] for, whatever personal affections may be involved, a crucial link is threatened. Their
 reasoning, however, is that relationships with the mother's brother are characteristi-
 cally easy, that they are not demanding, that there is much joking in them, and that to

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- 121 kill within this range is, in terms of the general pattern of behaviour, stupid. What is of
 613 interest is that such killings do occur. I recorded three instances of men killing the
 682 mother's brother in the contemporary population, not to mention many others
 674 based on hearsay evidence only. Clearly, the relationship is more than a merely per-
 824 missive one. The mother's brother may well be the only person who can help in
 604 certain crises, and if he withholds his assistance the sister's son is left in a dilemma.
 121 The form of behaviour in which demands are made is, as the Bedouin rightly say,
 613 that of asking a favour, but this does not mean that it is any the less urgent than a
 604 demand made against agnates. The range of favours is large, and only a few can be
 [55] detailed here. If a group has insufficient water to meet its needs a man first seeks help
 from his mother's brother. The request has a number of aspects to it: it is a test of
 the relationship itself; it is a matter of pride and status that a man can 'call' on
 another to help his group out of difficulties, it is an assurance that resources other than
 those jealously guarded by his agnates are available to him, and if a man is seeking
 to increase his power he must have available more than an agnate's share of local
 [82] water resources to supply his flocks and herds. When a blood-money payment has to
 be made, the mother's brother is expected to come forward—it is his right to give
 [584] without being asked. If a man wants a wife, he is not permitted to approach his father
 directly, but his mother's brother can put pressure on the father instead. If a man dies
 [429] while his eldest son is still a minor, his brother may be required to act as guardian,
 and in this role he controls the son's property; disputes frequently break out as a
 result, with the son at a considerable disadvantage, for he cannot engage his father's
 brother in hostilities—but his mother's brother can do so for him. Whenever men
 [422] come to possess animals before the demise of their fathers or when the father's
 brother is acting as guardian they mark them with the tribal and personal signs of their
 [583] mothers' brothers. Men have the right to demand contributions for bridewealth
 from their agnates if they lack wealth; in practice it comes not from them, but from
 the mother's brother. Finally, in certain circumstances, if a man does not have male
 heirs, his sister's son might inherit all his wealth.
- 121 Affinity also carries with it a large number of rights. A poor man may take up
 613 residence in the camp of his father-in-law, and be kept by him. The latter may come
 606 to his son-in-law's aid in many of his dealings with his father. Like the mother's
 brother, the affine is a potential source of water-supply when rain has been insufficient
 on the homeland. He also helps with blood money and bridewealth, and he is expected
 to aid his daughter and her husband with gifts of food and wool.
- 121 The details given above by no means exhaust the list of rights a man possesses in
 613 his matrilineal and affinal relatives. Obviously, these are not the only forms of
 relationship either, and the other forms carry with them yet other claims of various
 sorts. Enough detail has been given, however, to make clear the point that local
 agnatic groups are so differentiated, and inter-group relationships are so important,
 that each aspect of homicide settlement previously described will require further
 examination, not in the sense that additional complications must be introduced, but
 with the question in mind, is not the structural presentation false? Before beginning
 this stage of the argument it is necessary to establish the fact that the links of affinity
 and matrilineality which a group has with another are of a kind which necessitate
 their inclusion in an analysis of the arrangements for settling homicides.

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613 Among the Bedouin, men are permitted to marry their father's brother's daughter
582 and any other cousin of similar type within the local agnatic group. This means that
• 121 most agnates will be related in other ways as well. Parallel-cousin marriage has the
effect of diversifying the agnatic group, and creates small nuclei within it, each having
its own characteristics and patterns of behaviour with others. Diversification of this
kind leads to a differentiation between homicides within the tertiary group.

The Bedouin say that they always marry their parallel cousins, and do not give their
daughters to others if they can help it. Census data does not support this view. Nearly
as many men find wives outside their agnatic group as within it. Of importance
in the present context is the direction taken by these external marriages. Perhaps
121 the most striking feature is that the number of marriages with men of a collateral
582 tertiary group is low, so low that they can be explained by special circumstances.
628 Now collateral tertiary groups whose territories are adjacent experience intense day-
613 to-day relationships. In the context of descent these are the most closely linked
621 lineages—among older men there may be the recollection of the time when the two
constituted a single community, and when they all lived together in the same summer
camp. Common sentiment between them is very strong. The strips of territory they
inhabit may be almost identical. Their discreteness lies almost entirely in the pos-
session of separate natural resources, although in some cases pastures are shared.
But their social boundaries are nevertheless sharply drawn, for the high incidence of
parallel-cousin marriage within them, and the tendency for external links to leap-frog
collateral segments, gives them a definition which could not be bettered by exogamy.

121 The basis of their discreteness lies, of course, in the competition that exists between
628 them for natural resources; however much the Bedouin protest that their real enemies
613 are the secondary or primary groups lying some thirty to fifty miles away, when they
582 wish to enlarge their resources there is little point in attempting to capture a well a
long distance away, which cannot be defended, and might be located alongside an
enemy group. They do, it is true, engage in competitive hostilities over land and
water situated some distance from their homeland, but when they engage in these
activities they do so on behalf of a linked group, albeit with their own interests
uppermost. The capture of natural resources for use by a tertiary group can only be
achieved by an enlargement of its homeland, and this is only possible by expanding
into a neighbour's territory.

121 Another feature of external marriages is that they are not spread among as many
613 groups as in societies where there are exogamous clans, and where other rules of
582 marriage appear to compel the maximum amount of dispersal. Instead, the external
links created through marriage are highly selective, and are thrown out into ecologi-
cally differentiated areas, giving added economic security, or, in the case of date oases,
an additional item to the diet at a time of the year when it is sorely needed. Once
established these external links are perpetuated through cross-cousin marriages in
successive generations. If the link is considered valuable, and relationships develop
satisfactorily, other marriage connexions will be woven around the first. Multiplicity
gives added strength and durability, not in the mechanical sense of duplication, but of
creating a more diverse kin structure, with its greater range of rights and claims, in
which links can flourish. While the number of groups linked in marriage are few,
the geographical spread is great. Marriage links exist with tertiary sections of colla-

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teral secondary sections, with collateral primary sections, and long distances away into other tribes. This spread can be interpreted as giving each tertiary group access to resources of wide ecological diversity. What is of interest in the present context is not the interpretation of the links but the effect they have on behaviour. Spread means that a group can call for help from a number of differently situated groups. Each one of these links not merely modifies the structural means for settling homicide, but converts the homicide into a sociologically quite different sort of act. It can, as the Bedouin like to think, be an act of merit for a man to kill another from a feuding secondary section, but there is no merit whatsoever in it if the tertiary section of that secondary section happens to contain affines or maternal relatives; this is a sinful act. The Bedouin themselves recognize this when they add to their structural explanation the rider that they do not feud with cognatic relatives. The difference between their position and a sociological one is that they see this as a contingency not as a persistent necessity; they are able to maintain their position because they see their behaviour as explicable in terms of the simple ossified structure of their genealogical relationships. What they fail to appreciate is that these 'contingencies' are ecologically, economically, demographically, and politically essential. They are able to maintain their position also, because the model of a lineage structure they use, along with the two riders previously mentioned (see p. 270) affords them a kind of explanation for most occurrences. The argument is attractive both to Bedouin and to anthropologists because it is comprehensive and neat in its logicity. The next stage in the argument is to show that there is a far greater range of possible consequences to a homicide than those summarized in the diagram (see p. 269) and that the additional consequences are related, not to the lineage structure, but to the linkages which have been discussed above.

I begin with a review of a homicide which involves two men of the same tertiary section. Bedouin classify all homicides within this range—as they do for any of the structural orders—as undifferentiated, but in each case, different sorts of relatives are concerned in the ensuing hostilities, and the consequences are, therefore, different also. Bedouin say that a man never kills his father or full brother. In the event of a man killing another man acknowledged to be his father, the act itself proves that he cannot possibly be his son. He is said to be illegitimate, thus making his mother an adulteress and relieving the males of the agnatic line of the responsibility and the odium. If a maternal uncle of the agnatic group is killed, the offence is almost on a par with that of patricide or fratricide. When, however, the homicide is between two men who are agnatically distant, and not closely related cognatically either, but both are members of the same local agnatic group, what follows will depend largely on the size and stage of development of the group; if it is small, the homicide threatens to wreck it, but if it is large and on the verge of splitting the homicide may be the occasion for split taking place and being recognized publicly by a demand for blood money. Threatened with wreckage, a small group meets a homicide by closing its ranks for self preservation; a large group splits. The same event within the same kind of structural unit results in two quite dissimilar consequences. The reason is clear enough—the two groups are similar only in a general structural way, but sociologically they are not comparable.

When a homicide occurs between tertiary segments the solution, it was said earlier,

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- (12) is found in either a vengeance killing or a blood-money agreement which later becomes caught up in a wider set of debt relationships. Records show that this is true in some cases, but in others the blood money is paid in one instalment and immediately. The recognition of a debt and its liquidation among the Bedouin is tantamount to a declaration of hostility, since without a debt the means for smooth-running relationships is lacking. Such a blood-money payment was made between two tertiary groups in the absence of the 'owner of the blood'; when he returned he sought out his brother's killer, and took two lives for one. Subsequently, there was a further blood-money settlement but there remained 'a man left over'. In other circumstances an annual payment, called *sana*, is demanded in addition to the prompt and full payment of the blood money. The attachment of the *sana* to a settlement is an invidious condition since it is regarded as a fee by those who have to pay it, it is said to lower the status of a group and 'one day, it must be repudiated'.¹ It may, circumstances permitting, serve to cast off all pretence of friendly relationships. It is more likely that it will lead to a further outbreak of hostilities. When I witnessed the payment of the *sana* the terms in which it was demanded were: 'You have a man on your back. Are you going to repudiate this or are you going to give me *sana*? If you repudiate, we must seek vengeance.' The payment, one in a long series, was made on that occasion but there were loud grumblings among the men of the camp against their leader for his acquiescence and one suggested that they terminate the payments forthwith by shooting the claimant. Of the three forms of blood money cited, this latter is the extreme to which groups can go short of open feud. Its opposite is a blood-money payment which is mainly left as a debt, and which is accompanied by the 'gift' of a wife to the victim's group.² The wife is 'given' as an earnest that the offender's group wishes the full restoration of relationships ruptured by the homicide. There are, therefore, four forms of blood-money payment. The Bedouin view of these is that they are variants of what is, in principle, the same thing. Their view cannot be accepted. Each of the four payments points to diverse kinds of social relationships between groups, and their consequences are wholly disparate. These various kinds of relationships between the tertiary sections of the same secondary section exist because the relationships between all sections cannot possibly be the same if they are more than a pair in number. A secondary section which spans ten tertiary sections is not the same type of unit as one which spans only three. The greater the number of tertiary sections the greater the possible permutations in their relationships. What the Bedouin think of as variations in the form of blood-money payment is related to the complexities that lie behind their simple lineage model.
- (129) Bedouin can comprehend this complexity only by thinking in terms of a kind of average behaviour, regarding deviations from the average as fortuitous and explicable by the faulty reasoning that 'in this particular case, it just so happened' that this, that, and the other were part of the situation, failing to appreciate that apparent aberrations are constants to the extent that some sort of specifics occur in all cases. There is no reason why Bedouin reasoning should be followed in sociological analysis.

¹ See Peters, 1966.² A marriage is not legal unless at least a promise to hand over wealth has been made beforehand. In

the case cited the amount promised would be no more than a token—a sheep or a goat.

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The consequences of homicides in which secondary groups are concerned present an even greater variety, for now the span has expanded to include many more groups, with a total population of several thousand people. Groups of this order are spread over a much wider territorial range; some structurally distant groups are neighbours by virtue of their propinquity, while some structurally proximate groups are far removed territorially. Some feuds lie dormant for long periods. Others erupt frequently. Some homicides between these groups are followed by the 'laying down of the denial'—the feud situation with most acrimony built into it, for one denial, followed by a vengeance killing, is met by a second denial and so on, excluding thereby any chance of a settlement. In other circumstances the offender's group boast that they are responsible for a homicide, thus challenging the victim's group to a show of force. Only the more powerful tertiary groups would venture to do this, and it is only they who could meet a homicide against them with a spectacular show of force, compelling a weaker tertiary group (according to hearsay evidence) to break up and leave its homeland. The modes of killing in homicide differ in character. Some killings have been heinous and offensive in terms of general morality; their purpose is to sting the victim's kin to retaliate or to cause them to suffer general discredit and loss of status. While some parts of secondary segments are at feud, others are not. A homicide between affinally or matrilocally linked groups, whether they are secondary or primary groups, is settled as quickly and as amicably as possible to prevent turmoil in their relationships. Feud concerns two tertiary sections, not the opposed secondary sections of which they are parts. Blood money and vengeance is not the responsibility of secondary sections, but of their respective tertiary sections.

At this point, a further statement concerning the external marriage links of tertiary segments throws further light on the feud. Previously it was stated that the competition between collateral tertiary groups for natural resources is indicated by a low rate of marriage between them. Their external marriage links reinforce the separation. One tertiary section, A, takes some of its spouses from section X of a collateral secondary section; A's collateral, B, takes some of its spouses from X's collateral, Y. A may be at feud with Y and B with X. The agnatic links between A and B, and X and Y do not mitigate the severity of the hostility in the two feuds, they exacerbate it. It would be erroneous to think of them as cross-cutting ties which promote peace. Stultified in the development of their hostilities by virtue of their territorial proximity and the sentiment associated with putatively close agnatic connexion, A and B are able to express hostilities indirectly through their linked groups X and Y respectively. During discussions of disputes, homicides, or rival claims to water, whether the disputants meet in the camps or in administrative offices in the villages, men from the matrilineal and affinal groups of the parties directly concerned are also present to do most of the shouting. In some cases I recorded a maternal relative was killed on behalf of an agnatic group to which he did not belong, although the latter accepted the responsibility. In the light of facts of this sort the lineage model obstructs analysis.

I now wish to make a few brief remarks about the relationships between collateral primary sections and paired tribes. Homicide, it was asserted earlier, results in raids and war between groups of these orders of segmentation respectively. Evidence can be adduced to show that both consequences have followed. The case usually cited to demonstrate that a single killing precipitates war between tribes is the

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121 celebrated war between the 'Abaidat and the Bara 'asa tribes occupying a large part
 619 of central and eastern Cyrenaica. This war took place a hundred years ago, so that the
 682 evidence is mainly hearsay, but it is significant that when asked for details of the
 726 groups taking part the Bedouin make it clear that the entire tribes were not at war—
 1173 some sections on both sides are said to have remained on friendly terms. Yet when
 121 wars are discussed in a general fashion, the Bedouin insist that tribes confront each
 619 other as such. If it is pointed out to them that men might be ranged against their
 726 maternal relatives the Bedouin mumble apologetically that they would not kill their
 602 maternal relatives—a lame argument since in the heat of battle men cannot make this
 kind of discrimination. Details of other wars also illustrate the point that only parts
 of tribes face each other in strife, for though the stories of past events may be inaccurate
 there is genealogical evidence to substantiate their claims that certain groups
 were linked in the past, and in any case their statements assert that where these links
 exist they are not prepared to engage in hostilities. The several parts of each tribe,
 like the parts of primary and secondary sections, have as many different sorts of
 relationships, as there are groups, and the general statement that tribes are warring
 units merely obscures the interest there is in their relationships. Tribes, further, lack
 the leadership to make war. I repeat that leadership does exist, but not even the
 greatest leaders, past or present, can rightly be described as leaders of their tribes,
 using the term in its structural connotation. Literature on the subject gives the
 impression that there are tribal leaders, because successive administrations have used
 the tribes and their divisions as a framework for attempting to rule the Bedouin, but
 the details of the power domains of individual leaders make it clear that they have
 little to do with the ordered divisions of tribes. A leader within part of one tribe may
 carry with him tertiary sections of another tribe, and if major hostilities break out
 between parts of these tribes, the sections of both which are joined as allies and
 related as kinsfolk will not fight against each other, for sections so linked enjoy
 stronger connexions than the structurally linked tertiary sections of a very large
 secondary section. Consequently the statement that homicide results in tribal war
 when the offender and his victim are members of two separate tribes is not merely
 incomplete, not merely a simplification, it is wrong.

121 A point which has been implicit throughout the second part of this paper needs
 613 now to be made quite explicit: groups do not come together in their respective
 571 structural genealogical orders. During my entire residence in Cyrenaica I did not
 114 see a group of agnates larger than a tertiary tribal section assemble for any purpose.
 648 It is true that the occasions when large groups are required to assemble are infrequent.
 It is also true that although the British Administration was serving a caretaker role
 only, it may have had an affect on the nature of tribal gatherings. Despite this qualification,
 there were several occasions when I expected tribal groups to assemble in
 lineage order if the fusion of sections in relation to like sections has any meaning in
 practice. Large groups of men did gather to dispute claims to wells, to argue about
 rights to ploughland, and to make peace. In every case that I recorded the agnatically
 closest groups of the main participants were absent, while members of genealogically
 more remote groups were present in strength. This statement applies to gatherings
 in the camps and in the administrative centres. One of the biggest gatherings I
 628 witnessed assembled in an administrative office in a village near the coast in the

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south-west of the country. Most members of the two tertiary groups directly concerned in the dispute were present. The agnates of the collaterally linked groups of the principals were unrepresented; indeed collaterals of one of the principals made it quite explicit that they were opposed to their genealogical allies and considered their perusal of the matter tiresome. The bulk of the crowd present was made up of men linked to the principals in a variety of different and non-agnatic ways, and it was they who provided most of the argument once the issue had been opened. It follows, therefore, that an analysis of political organization and behaviour in Cyrenaica which is based on lineage theory leads to a gross misrepresentation. For, what I am arguing is not that the lineage model in its rarefied state is too simple, not that additional facts must be injected into it to complicate it, but that it does not provide an admissible basis for analysis.¹ The complication of something that is founded in error can only lead to complicated error, however many facts of real life are introduced in an attempt to give it substance. The Bedouin conception of their social relationships in terms of a genealogical ordering of groups is a fact of their social life, and in relation to some problems it is an important fact. My objection to the use which has been made of a people's ideology of their relationships is that it has been elevated from its status as a component of social life to such a position of universal dominance in all sets of social relationships that 'every sociological problem', as Fortes writes of the Tallensi, 'hinges on the lineage system'.²

If the ordering of groups within the frame of the Bedouin genealogy is abandoned as a basis for analysis, it does not follow that the only remaining view is that of small groups of people distributed throughout the country enjoying relationships merely as units. Regularity in relationships does exist, it is urgently necessary, and it persists; but this regularity is not consistent with a lineage model. Ultimately, feud is a violent form of hostility between corporations which has its source in the competition for proprietary rights in land and water. This competition makes it necessary for groups to combine to prevent the encroachments of others in similar combinations and also to expand their resources whenever the opportunity arises. The significant groups in a discussion of the feud are these power groups, and it is their composition, the shifting alliances within them, the growth and diminution in the power of tertiary

¹ Dr. Paul Bohannan has distinguished in his writings between what he calls folk systems and analytical systems. The distinction, as he sees it, is set out clearly in the statement 'a certain field of Nuer relationships is explained by Nuer in terms of an agnatic genealogy. This is the folk system. The same field is explained, in English, by Professor Evans-Pritchard, as a lineage system based on the principle of segmental opposition. This is an analytical system' (Bohannan, 1957, p. 5). What is the difference? Is it only a difference of language? Bohannan's analytical statement is little more than a generalisation of what is in the folk system. An analytical system, in his hands, is a sophistication of a folk system, for it is the latter which provides him with his analytical framework. The act of creativity on the part of the social anthropologist about which he writes (Bohannan, 1963, p. 14) is the revealing of a folk system through analysis. But he does not

depart from the framework set by informants—the agnatic genealogy is the lineage, and the fission and fusion of parts, the opposition of like segments and so on is explained by informants in different languages as adequately as it is explained by social anthropologists in English. Bohannan's viewpoint is made clearer, perhaps, in his discussion on the arrangement of facts relating to Tiv law. Here he considers what he should do once he has elicited all the facts, and he argues against setting them out as an arrangement of the procedural law of Tiv courts because, 'The error would be that the arrangement is not part of the Tiv way of looking at it, and hence would be false' (Bohannan, 1957, p. 69. *Italics mine*). Why? The Tiv are not the social anthropologists. Is the rest of an analytical model its consistency with a folk comprehension?

² Fortes, 1945, p. 30.

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- sections constituting the combinations which makes the facts of feud intelligible. Furthermore, several different types of power structures exist which serve the different interests of the people composing them, and these are interlinked in combinations of superior span. But the formation of these structures and the modes in which they combine are quite unlike the articulations in a lineage system. Characteristically, the segments in a lineage system are conceived of as building up hierarchically to span what is spoken of as a total society, the apex of the system affording a spectacular and fixed definition of its boundaries. Had I been using this concept in this paper the founding ancestress of the nine Cyrenaican tribes, Sa'ada as named by the Bedouin, would have served this purpose and would have been given inappropriate prominence. The views presented here have the consequences of retreating from a concept of a total society. The people to whom the facts given are related are the camel-herding tribes only. Some of them have relations of many kinds with the cow-herding folk who inhabit the northern plateau area, and these relations are also significant for the analysis of a wide range of problems; genealogically both cow and camel herders are seen as part of a single structure, but the differences between them with regard to their economy, the size, composition, and distribution of their residential units, their political and ritual life is so great that to conceive of them as a single social structure is not useful. Moreover, the far western tribal sections have relationships of such urgency with their neighbours in Tripolitania (who are excluded from Cyrenaican genealogies) that to cut off these relationships as lying outside Cyrenaican society would be quite unwarranted. The same can be said of the relationships of the tribal sections in the eastern part of Cyrenaica with their genealogical cousins, the Aulad 'Ali of Egypt, who, although residing across a national border, are closely linked to some of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. Some tribes also have to rely on the people of the southern oases for an item of diet and an outlet for surplus wool, and the net of kinship is spread out to include them. In these cases they come into contact with other ethnic groups such as Berbers and Tibu, and through the oases they extend their lines of communication southwards to Wadai, Chad, and Bornu. As an indication of the effectiveness of these links, it is only necessary to add that people inhabiting Cyrenaica make periodic and regular visits to these far southern places, and that in 1948 a shaikh, living near Ajadabiya in south-western Cyrenaica, collected blood-money contributions from kinsmen in Wadai. A single structure cannot possibly include, for analytical purposes, these sorts of relationships.
- Finally, it must be stressed that the facts given here refer to the period 1948 to 1950. Since then oil has been discovered in large quantities near the territory of a tribe where I spent most of my time while resident in the country, and where there was one tin shack in 1950 there is now a modern port with roads extending southwards from it into the wilderness. I see no reason to assume that social relations as I observed them are present today or that they were the same at any time in the past either. Before the advent of the Sanusi Order in the early eighteen-forties, it is known that one lineage at least was dominantly powerful and that its leader tyrannized a large part of Central Cyrenaica.¹ His descendants constituted a powerful group in

¹ Smith and Porcher, 1864. These two archaeologists met this leader and continued their archaeological researches around Cirene only with his good-

will, although the site is not on the territory of his tribe as I knew it in 1950. They also speak of him as inhabiting a castle which also lies outside the

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1950, but his kind of tyranny was absent from the Cyrenaica of that period. From the mid-nineteenth century until the Italian invasion of 1911, the Sanusi Order established itself, spread its lodges throughout the tribes and in other more remote lands until it became what Evans-Pritchard speaks of as a theocratic empire.¹ The lodges served as areas of sanctuary and their staffs adjudicated disputes. Leaders of the Order had the power to coerce and the Bedouin obeyed. They obeyed out of personal regard for some of them in 1950, but the religious authority previously used by the leaders had given way to the political power they now exercised as functionaries in a state system. In the meantime, the country had been ravaged by the long Italo-Sanusi wars. Throughout the nineteen-thirties after suffering terrible privations and reduction in numbers through slaughter in war, death in concentration camps, and exile, the Bedouin were ruled by the Italians. During the Second World War the armies of three major contestants fought their battles where the Bedouin now tend their flocks and herds. After the war they were left to fend for themselves, with a minimum of administrative interference.

In the light of all this the conception of an equilibrium system is of little heuristic value, still less its derivative concept of a repetitive system. This does not mean, however, that an account of part of the social life of the Bedouin as it existed in 1950 must be nothing more than a disconnected piece of history, unrelated to a prior state of things and wholly useless for the understanding of the contemporary oil-producing cum mixed pastoral-agricultural economy. It would be little more than a piece of social historiography if the analysis was based on the concept of a total social structure of functionally interconnected parts, forming what Leach describes as 'a delicately balanced mechanism rather like the various parts of a wrist watch'.² Such a viewpoint would effectively exclude any possible comprehension of changes save those present as part of the dynamics of a system; its only answer to change is an account of a different system. If, instead, attention is focused on the analysis of a field of components arranged in a specific fashion to meet the interests of men at a particular time, it then becomes possible to see how a shift in their positions, the addition of new components, or the elimination of others produces this or that effect. It can make intelligible what has gone before, and if the future cannot be anticipated it can be demarcated within rough limits.

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modern territory of his tribe. See also Hamilton, 1956.

¹ Evans-Pritchard, 1949. In this book a brilliant account is given of the development of the Order,

and how it came to unify and provide centralized political leadership for the tribes.

² Leach, 1961, p. 6.

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The Bedouin of Cyrenaica

in position immediately anyone else appears at the entrance to the tent.¹¹ Women cook, but they do not serve the meal to males, nor are they responsible for the distribution of meat among them. Parts of an animal are carefully specified, and the various portions distributed at a meal carry with them a great deal of significance. A host can honour, flatter, disappoint or even insult his guest, depending on the precise distribution of meat he adopts. Designated portions should go to certain kinsmen if they are present, but this still leaves a wide margin of choice, and a host can use this choice as part of the many means at his disposal for directing his relationships with other men. A political link can be forged or another snapped by the distribution of portions of meat at the commensal meal.

The Bedouin Ideal Type of Family as a Unit of Production

This account of the division of labour is far from inclusive of all the tasks carried out. The details given are only barely sufficient to provide some indication of the necessary composition of a family. Referring again to the Bedouin sentiments about the matter, it is now possible to give it some numerical precision. The number of females should be a minimum of about three, including a mother, a teen-age daughter and a child of about eight years. Males should number about six: a father, relieved of most chores to act as director; a son in his middle to late twenties, to plough; a second son, in his early to middle twenties, to herd the camels; a third, in his late teens to early twenties, to shepherd the sheep; a fourth, middle to late teens, to look after the goats; and a younger son to fetch, carry and run errands about the camp. The family of the ordinary Bedouin, they say, shows this sex and age distribution, although they recognise that a politically ambitious man with the wealth to match his aspirations would require more of both sexes — particularly women, since the burden of entertainment increases rapidly with a man's climb to power and fame.

Clearly, the basis of Bedouin sentiment concerning family structure is its approximation to an ideal production unit. Some families display the features of this ideal, but even they enjoy the productive benefits of this composition for a very limited period only. The family, as described above, can only be an ephemeral unit, since the age structure constantly changes, women are removed by marriage, men move away and death affects it at any point at any time. The Bedouin family is a fiction in the sense that it can be said to have a characteristic composition. The mistake they make is to conceive of it as a particular kinship structure related to production. The substance of what has been referred to as a fiction is that, if viewed as a productive unit, it bears close consistency with reality. Freed of the need to examine it in terms of specifically limited kinship relationships, and no longer anchored to the inhabitants of a single tent, the distribution of people according to sex and

¹¹ This is the general rule. In practice, the use of the divider can indicate an intimacy or distance in relationships, most subtly.

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- age depicted in their notion of a family is meaningful. It follows that, since this unit will not be clustered in one tent, but distributed over several, each small community must be so constituted that links people can use to claim the services of others must exist, and that, since claims can be made against various sorts of kinship relationships, each small camp will have predictable kin links. It follows, further, that since age, sex and number of people are significant, a small camp will have a characteristic demographic structure; each tent in a camp will display developmental changes, and particular tents may be shifted from one camp to another, but if a livelihood is to be gained in this semi-desert environment supporting its mixed pastoral-cum-agricultural economy, then at any given time the small camp must have certain fixed features in its composition. The elementary family is subject to far too many vicissitudes to exist on its own. It now remains to demonstrate this general argument by examining the details of one of these small camps.

A Particular Camp Viewed in Detail

- The camp was one of 12 which constitute a minimal tribal section. In genealogical terms its male members were linked through an ancestor five ascending generations from living males of about 20 years of age. Usually, in summer, camps of this sort move to the vicinity of a large watering point; in winter, this larger community breaks up into a number of smaller ones as man and animals move off further south to the pastures. The total living population of the tribal section to which this particular camp belonged was 524.

- Linked patrilineally, its male members were also linked in a plurality of other consanguineal ways. Primarily, this plurality was brought about by parallel-cousin marriage. The incidence of this form of marriage for males of this group was 48 per cent¹² of the gross total of 234, derived from their marriages over three generations; that is, the generation of males entering into marriage, and the generation which has begun to die out are included with the generation of middle-aged males. This means that practically every male is related to others in a number of ways, and it is necessary to point this out now because the details to be given presently will show only the more immediate, but not all, existing connections. Plurality of links, moreover, is not the only consequence. Parallel-cousin marriage is a transmuting agent, creating a diversity of links. Each and every link carries with it specific modes of behaviour, which in turn means that each individual has a wide variety of different claims he can press on his co-residents. Marriage connections also exist with other sections of the same tribe. Their proportion is 28 per cent of the total. Demographically, it

¹² As a matter of interest, the figure for marriage to the father's brother's daughter is 50 per cent of the figure for parallel-cousin marriage in general, but the consequences of these are beyond the scope of the present discussion.